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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 I.B.E.W.

Case #133000988-02
-andDATATECH SYSTEMS, INC.
_Y

The above-named Union and Employer could not stipulate
a precise issue. The Union claims that the dispute involves the
performance
through

of work by bargaining unit employees

on a Sunday

Thursday workweek at all or many of 443 Lowe's Home

Installation Warehouses and stores in a wide geographical

area.

It seeks a remedy of double time pay for all employees who so
worked on Sundays at all such locations.1
The

Company

sees

the

issues

as

confined

to

the

particular grievance filed, which, prior to being submitted to
arbitration,
procedure.

was

processed

through

the

contract

grievance

In the Company's view the issue involves the claim of

five employees who, in that grievance, seek double time pay for
the Sundays they worked on the Combo II project, limited to those
locations at which those five worked.

xThe

Sunday through Thursday schedule was paid at straight time
as regular work days and regular workweek. The first Sunday
was paid at double time as the "seventh day of the prior week."

A hearing was held on October 8, 2002 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
I ruled at the hearing

that the scope of the issue

oefore me was defined by the written grievance (Joint Exhibit 2a)
reserving the Union's right to process other grievances regarding
the same work at Lowe's locations performed by other bargaining
unit members.
The issue involves the application and
of

Article

agreement.

X

Section

10.02(d)

of

the

interpretation

collective

bargaining

That Section reads in pertinent part:
(d) "On certain projects only (such
as
fast
food chains, convenience
stores and retail gas stations) the
workweek
may
be
Sunday
through
Thursday.
If requested, the need to
work Sunday through Thursday shall be
substantiated to the Union..."
The Company scheduled the Combo II job at the Lowe's

locations in accordance with that contract provision.
It

asserts

that

10.02(d), its negotiation

based

on

the

language

of

Section

history, past practice and a prior

agreement with the Union, it had the contractual right to do so,
thereby paying the affected employees straight time wages for the

time worked.

That being so,

asserts the Company,

it is not

obligated to pay a premium rate for Sunday work under

Section

10.02(a) which, in pertinent part reads:
"...all work performed on Sundays
paid at the double time rate."

shall be

The history of Article X Section 10.02(d) is relevant.
Previous

to

meaningfully

its

foregoing

different.

wording,

The phrase

it

was

"such

slightly,

but

as" preceding

the

specific reference to "fast food chains, convenience stores and
retail gas stations," was "i.e."

It then read:

(d) on certain projects only (i.e., fast food
chains, convenience stores and retail gas
stations..." (emphasis added)
That

change,

from

"i.e."

to

"such

as"

altered

the

meaning of Section 10.02(d), but I conclude, not in any way that
made it less clear or less unambiguous.

Nor, in my view, did the

change support the Company's action in this case.
In its earlier form, the "i.e.," dictionarily

defined

as "that is," meant that under Section 10.02(d) the Company could
schedule a straight time workweek of Sunday through Thursday only
for work performed at those three types of locations.

The change

to "such as" expanded the type of facilities at which work could
be scheduled
convenience

Sunday

through Thursday beyond

stores and retail gas stations.

fast food chains,
But, the expanded

authority does not extend to a such a massive, multi-product, and

widely

geographically

located

facility

as

Lowe's

Home

Installations stores and warehouses.
It is undisputed that Lowe's is a major retailer of
literally

thousands

of

products

used

construction, renovation and decorations.

in

homes

for

home

Each location covers

literally hundreds of yards or acres of territory.

The record

indicates that it is made up, nationally, of more than 400 stores
or warehouses.
I

conclude

that

Lowe's

does

not

fit

into

the

categories of business covered by Section 10.02(d) even with the
change from "i.e." to "such as."
The well-settled rule of ejusdem generis compels this
conclusion.
The Blacks Law Dictionary definition of "such

(as)"

is:
"of that kind; having particular quality
or character specified; identical with, being
the same as what has been mentioned; alike;
similar; of the like; kind; is descriptive of
the object particularized; refers to the last
antecedent"
Clearly

then,

the

changed

and

instant

wording

of

Section 10.02(d) allows for a Sunday through Thursday straight
time workweek not only for fast food chains, convenience stores,
and retail gas stations; but also for facilities like, similar
to, of the same character as, of the same quality as, those three

antecedents. Lowe's is so different, qualitatively, characteristically, economically and structurally that by no stretch of the
imagination could it fit within the limits of Section 10.02(d)
even with the change from "i.e." to "such as."

Indeed, to find

that Section 10.02(d) includes an establishment like Lowe's would
nullify

the

convenience

descriptive
stores

and

references

retail gas

to

fast

stations.

food
But

chains,

the

three

descriptive types, for coverage and as examples, remain in the
contract, and it is to the contract language that the arbitrator
is bound.

It is obvious

language for a purpose —
limited

expansion,

Thursday

straight

the
time

to me

that the parties left that

namely to condition, albeit with some
circumstances
work

schedule

when
is

a

Sunday

proper.

through

With

that

finding, I need not decide whether, as the Union asserts, the
common characteristics of the three mentioned types of businesses
are "mom and pop" stores, or franchised establishments.
With the foregoing compelling application of ejusdem
generis, Section 10.02(d) is and remains clear and unambiguous.
As such, and based on well-settled arbitration rules, it preempts

any past practice,

ad hoc

arrangements

or negotiation

history to the contrary.
Nonetheless, mention of the Company's reliance thereon
bears some comments.

The negotiation history of Section 10.02(d)

is not contrary

to the foregoing conclusions.

The Company's

testimony was that it told the Union that Section 10.02(d) was
too restrictive and that the Company needed greater flexibility.
As a result, the Union suggested changing "i.e." to "such as" and
that was acceptable to the Company.

The testimony did not show

that the parties talked of specific examples of how "such as" was
to apply.

The evidence revealed no bilateral discussions of the

new language as applicable for such a massive complex as Lowe's,
or anything comparable to Lowe's.

So, no matter what the Company

thought it had obtained by the change, there is no evidence of a
bilateral agreement to open up Section 10.02(d) wide enough to
encompass enterprises like Lowe's.
The extensive exhibit
at supermarkets,
Uptons,

(Employee #11) of work performed

banks, Libbey Owen Ford, Pet Smart, Target,

(etc.) at straight time Sunday to Thursday schedules,

does not dismiss possible Union agreement to those assignments,
nor

does

knowledge.

it

disclose

Nonetheless,

Union

acquiescence

or

even

Union's

the universally well-settled rule is

that past practice, though valid and enforceable when engaged in,
is

immaterial

in

the

face

of

prospective

application

and

enforcement of a clear contract term that is contrary.
Also, the Company's relevance on an apparent agreement
on January 28, 2000 between the Company and a representative of

Local 1430 (the predecessor to Local 3) permitting this Sunday to
Thursday workweek is not sufficiently probative in the instant
case. That alleged agreement is in self-serving written form by
the

Company,

and

authentication.

there

was

no

testimony

It stands as hearsay.

As

by

its

author

for

such it cannot be

construed as a contract change.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The five employees who signed the grievance
of June 24, 2001 (Joint Exhibit 2a) are
entitled
to
double
pay
for work
they
performed on project Combo II on Sundays at
Lowe's Home Improvement facility.
The grievance is granted. The Company Shall
pay to said employees a sum equal to the
difference between straight time pay they
received, and double time pay as required
under Article X Section 10.02 (a) of the
collective bargaining agreement.

Eric p. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

October 21, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmert-z do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 3 IBEW

Case #13300022871

-andGE CONSUMER HOME SERVICES

-X

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of COLLISE BEST?
A hearing was held on February 21, 2002 at which time
Mr.

Best,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

and

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument

and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The Employer filed a post-hearing

brief.
The grievant protests his discharge.
I make the following Finding of fact.
The grievant, a service technician, for the Employer, making a
service call on August 21, 2001 to repair a General Electric
appliance at the apartment of a resident at 35 Prospect Park
Place, Brooklyn, three times used or tried to use the front

entrance of the apartment house though repeatedly instructed by
the doorman and building manager that he was to use the service
entrance.
I find that he disregarded these instructions
knowingly and defiantly.

I also find that the instructions were

consistent with the rules of the apartment house and nondiscriminatorily applicable to all service personnel.

As such

these instructions and that rule are and is common to that type
of building and hence reasonable.
I also find that though the grievant did use the
service entrance, albeit grudgingly, as well as the front
entrance in trips to or from the resident's apartment, he made a
provocative and defiant last effort to re-enter the building by
the front entrance to deliver a receipt for the repairs services.
When he tried to do so he confronted the building manager and two
doormen in the entranceway.

Instead of handing them the receipt,

he tried to push through them and assaulted the manager with a
punch to his face, cutting the manager's lip.

He then left and

was later apprehended.
Violent conduct of this type, with its obvious effect
on the Employer's reputation and potential monetary or other
legal liability is grounds for discipline, including discharge,
regardless of an employee's prior employment record.

Had this

grievant not been repeatedly instructed to use the service
entrance, I would have doubted the justification of the three
apartment employees blocking or standing in the front
entranceway.

But having been so instructed and warned, the

grievant's persistent effort to use the front entrance was a
provocative act in his part and the proximate cause of the
violence.
If, as here, the Employer elects to impose the summary
penalty of discharge, it is, under the particular circumstances
of this case a managerial prerogative within the bounds of just
cause.
The Undersigned having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of COLLISE BEST is denied.
discharge is sustained.

His

Eric" jT ^chmert'z, "Arbitrator

DATED:

April 1, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

,

x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 282 IBT
-and-

GRANITE HALMAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
,

V"

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just
ANGELO TORRES?
remedy?

cause for the discharge of
If not, what shall be the

A hearing was held on June 18, 2002 at which time Mr.
Torres,

hereinafter

representatives

referred

to

of the above-named

as
Union

the

"grievant"

and Company

and

appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The

grievant

a

driver/chauffeur

Company with sole responsibility
boom

truck

which

he was

is

charged

by

the

for an accident with and to a

operating

at a work

site

at the JFK

Airport on February 6, 2002.
The Company asserts that that accident which resulted in
damage to the boom truck in the amount of $16,177 together with a

prior accident to the boom truck on January 23, 2002, also driven
by the grievant, warrant his discharge.
The grievant does not deny either accident and accepts
responsibility, but not sole responsibility.
was working under instructions
and that

the work

explicit

directions

various

assignments

from and direction of a foreman,

assignments
of

the

within

He explains that he

given him by

foreman
the

and

the

regular

work

the foreman,
rush

to

shift

the

complete
to

avoid

overtime contributed, respectively to both accidents.
With this explanation, the grievant and the Union on his
behalf assert that the grievant was not, as the Company charges,
solely liable for the accidents.
The second accident of February
serious

and

was

the

triggering

event

6, 2002 was the most
for

the

grievant's

discharge.1
A description
form from the Company.

of that accident is in official written
(Company Exhibit 2).

It reads:

The first accident of January 23rd caused minor damage to the
truck's mirror and exhaust pipe.

1

GRANITE HALMAR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
JFK AIRPORT - TERMINAL 7 - BRITISH AIR
ACCIDENT
FEBRUARY 6, 2002
ABOUT 2:45 PM

Foreman: Guillermo Gonzales
Teamster: Angelo Torres
Vehicle:

Boom Truck #4.7076

The boom truck went into the VIP Parking Lot
by Intersection #51 and unloaded forms and
lumber off the back.
From there, the truck
went into Recirc Road to pick up a walkbehind saw.
The truck then proceeded to Intersection #51
where a compressor was hooked onto the back
of boom truck for towing back to Yard.
Foreman assumed that Teamster had retracted
the boom so he entered the truck and gave the
Teamster the OK to go.
Only after hitting
the overhead DEP bridge did the Foreman
realize that the boom was not all the way
down.
The boom scraped the right side (underside)
of the bridge.
The boom got hung up on the
beam and followed its course while the truck
was moving.
The truck was pushed into the
temporary barrier and gate, to the west of
Intersection #51, and then righted itself.
The truck was driven to the west end of the
Terminal and examined. Then the vehicle was
towed from the accident scene to the North
Boundary Road facility.
There was no apparent damage to the physical
structures of the DEP bridge.
No pedestrians or vehicles were involved or
affected by this accident.
3

The grievant accepts that Report as accurate.
As an official Company record, it refutes the Company's
assertions at the hearing that it was not a "foreman" that worked
with the grievant but a "laborer."
Gonzales.

The Report is from Forman

Additionally, it was Gonzales that the Company asked to

make out the accident report.

I do not believe that if he were

merely

have

a

"laborer"

he

would

been

given

that

important

assignment.
Moreover, that Gonzales was a foreman is consistent with
the grievant's testimony and the Company could not offer probative
evidence to the contrary.
More significant is the role that Gonzales played in the
work activities of the boom truck and the grievant on February 6,
2002.

The grievant testified that Gonzales directed him to the

various work assignments that day, and, instructed the grievant
where to go and what work to perform.

And Gonzales was with the

grievant as those assignments were undertaken and performed.
testimony

of Gonzales'

over

grievant

the

evidence.

was

instructional
not

refuted

if not
by

That

supervisory status

Company

witnesses

or

Indeed what the Company had to say on that matter was

unclear, indecisive and entirely hearsay.

It is not disputed by the grievant or the Union that the
grievant was
grievant

in charge of operating the

failed

to

lower

the

boom

truck, and

before proceeding

that the
to

the

overpass where the collision between the overpass (or bridge) and
the elevated boom occurred.

But, asserts the grievant, Gonzales

"pushed him" to complete several jobs toward the end of the shift
(moving a compressor and picking up a walk behind saw) and that
the intensity and pressure of those assignments, all directed by
Gonzales, together with Gonzales' "OK (to the grievant) to go,"
again under time pressure to finish and avoid overtime, caused the
grievant to forget to lower the boom resulting in a collision with
a bridge.2
Gonzales did not testify, and the only witness for the
Company,

its Regional Manager, could not refute the grievant's

description of the events.

So I accept the grievant's testimony

as an accurate recitation of what happened.
I find similarly with regard to the earlier accident of
January 23rd.

The grievant testified, also unrefuted, that Foreman

Gonzales directed him to lift and move some pipes from a location
that could not be seen from the boom truck because obscured by a
Dempster Dumpster. Gonzales positioned himself where he, Gonzales,

2

It is stipulated that the bridge suffered no damage.

could see the piping and the boom truck, and directed the grievant
in activating the boom and retrieving the pipes.
unable

As a result,

to see directly what he was doing, and relying on the

"eyes" and directions of Gonzales, a pipe "slipped off" and struck
the trucks mirror and exhaust.
I

must

conclude,

again

in

the

absence

of

contrary

testimony, that while the grievant was responsible for the unsafe
use of the boom, he did so on the instructions and directions of
Foreman Gonzales.

So, again, the responsibility for that accident

must be shared by both.
In short, though I find the grievant negligent in both
accidents,

I

do

not

find

him

solely

liable

or

responsible.

Liability and responsibility rests also with Foreman Gonzales, who
acted, I conclude in a superior or supervisory capacity.
Though the grievant was responsible for operating the
truck and the boom, Gonzales was responsible for putting the truck
and

its

operation

in

a

position

and

under

circumstances

contributing to the accidents.
Accordingly, the Company's charge against the grievant
that he was solely responsible for the accident is rejected.

Under that finding a penalty for the grievant is appropriate, but
less than discharge.

What is appropriate is a suspension for his

part in the accidents.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
Union and Company, makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discharge of
ANGELO TORRES.
There is just cause for a
disciplinary suspension.
Therefore as the Union requests, Mr. Torres
shall be restored to the Company's seniority
list and is eligible for future employment.
However, no back pay is awarded. The period
of time between the grievant's discharge and
his restoration to the seniority list shall
be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

June 26, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
LOCAL 1066, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO,
Union,
- and MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY, INC,
Employer.

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the Union:
Elizabeth Alexander, Esq.
Gleason & Matthews, P.C.
26 Broadway, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004-1864
For the Employer:
C. Peter Lambos, Esq.
William M. Spelman, Esq.
Lambos & Junge
29 Broadway, 9th Floor
New York, NY 10006

INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 2002, a hearing was held concerning a dispute which had deadlocked
before the Industry Appellate Committee in October, 2001. The issue submitted by Local
1066, ILA (Union) for arbitration is whether the Mediterranean Shipping Company, Inc.
(Company or Employer) violated the Master Contract when two import line containers
containing consolidated cargo were "stripped" by non-union labor at a live pier. A
stenographic transcript of the hearing was taken. That transcript and the documents
submitted into evidence constitute the record for opinion and award. The parties were
represented at the hearing by counsel who waived the Arbitrator's oath. The parties were
afforded a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to submit
documentary evidence. There were no objections to the conduct of the hearing. Counsel
for the parties filed post-hearing memoranda. Counsel for the Company filed a reply to
the Union's memorandum.
ISSUE
As earlier noted, the issue submitted for arbitration, although not expressly so
stipulated by counsel at the hearing, is the following:
Did the Company violate the Master Contract when two
import line containers containing consolidated cargo were
stripped by non-ILA labor at a live pier? If so, what shall be
the remedy?

RELEVANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Master Contract
11-12. ILA JURISDICTION OVER WORK COVERED BY
THE MASTER AGREEMENT
Containerization Agreement
(A) Management hereby reaffirms that the ILA employee
has jurisdiction over longshore, checker, maintenance and
other ILA craft work conferred on such workers by the
Containerization Agreement, set forth in the Appendix.
Clerical Work
(B) Clerks shall perform all clerical work on container
waterfront facilities which traditionally and regularly has
been performed by them including work related to the receipt
and delivery of cargo, hatchchecking, prestow, (hatch
sequence sheet) plan clerking, recording and receipt and
delivery of containers received or delivered at waterfront
facilities, timekeeping, location and yard work, and
demurrage recording, which work shall not be removed from
the waterfront facility. The input and output of information by
computers related to the foregoing work functions shall also
be performed by Checkers and Clerks.
Port Authorities
(F) The parties agree to the creation of a joint committee
for the purpose of meeting with representatives of Port
Authorities on issues of jurisdiction. The issues involved
therein are covered by a letter from Management's Chairman
to the ILA President of this date.
Work Opportunities
(H) The parties agree that any chance of reacquiring the
work of stuffing and stripping containers requires a dedicated
work force of trained, productive workers hired at
compensation commensurate with the local competition and
without any restrictive rules. The parties should examine into
this subject and all of its conditions.

Clerks General Cargo Agreement
ARTICLE 2- UNION SECURITY
The Employers agree that they will not directly perform
clerking work done on a pier or terminal, or contract out such
work which historically and regularly has been and currently
is performed by employees who are members of the Union
unless the Union is not able to or does not supply sufficient
and qualified personnel to perform such work. Personnel
supplied by the Union shall, at a minimum, be able to read
and write in the English language and to perform the
arithmetic computations necessary for clerking work.
ARTICLE 12 — WORK RULES
A set-up shall be defined as consisting of a minimum of one
Chief Clerk, one Book Clerk and one Clerk. Set-ups as
required shall be established as follows with the understanding that each set-up will not handle more than three
vessels discharging and/or loading cargo at the same time.
One set-up for each of the following: Commonwealth Pier,
Hoosac Pier, Mystic Pier, Wiggins 51, East Boston Pier 1,
East Boston Piers 3 and 4 (limited to the West Side of Pier 4),
East Boston Pier 4 (East Side) and the Horn track, Army Base
Berths 1 and 2, Army Base Berths 4, 5,6,7 and the Army Base
Berths 8, 9, 10.
ARTICLE 34 — SHIP OPPORTUNITY COMMITTEE
There shall be established a Ship Opportunity Committee
composed of the Executive Board of Local 1066 and
representatives from the BSA which shall meet as necessary
to respond to inquiries for new business. Said meetings shall
be solely between the BSA and Local 1066. The purpose of
this Committee shall be to attract new shippers and cargoes to
the Port.
Labor and management acknowledge equally the need for
union jobs and fringe benefit contributions to the funds. Both
parties will jointly act to encourage, as far as legally
permissible, the use of the services offered by the ILA to the
operators of all vessels and assist in direct discussion by these

operators with the ILA and the BSA for that purpose with the
joint ship opportunity committee.

PARTIES CONTENTIONS
UNION
The employees who are represented by the Union have jurisdiction over the work
that was done by non-union labor at a waterfront facility in the Port of Boston (Port).
The Company violated the Master Contract as alleged when it voluntarily surrendered its
control over the containers to the consignee. Delivery of the containers to the consignee
did not end the Company's contractual obligations to the Union. Moreover, the
Company participated in a scheme with the Massachusetts Port Authority of Boston
(Massport), which owns and operates the public terminals in the Port, to circumvent the
Union's jurisdiction within the Port as evidenced and established by the Company's and
Massport's failure and refusal to meet to discuss jurisdictional issues and their similar
failure and refusal to protect and promote opportunities for "stuffing," "stripping" and
other work and the acquisition of new business.
COMPANY
The Company did not have the containers stripped. It delivered the containers to a
consignee pursuant to a port-to-port bill of lading. After delivery, the Company did not
and could not control the consignee's actions. The act in alleged violation of the Master
Contract was not decided by or performed by the Company. Therefore, the contract was
not and could not have been violated by the Company. The stripping was done at the

consignee's direction and control, not the Company's. The Company was powerless to
direct the consignee to use union labor to strip the containers. Indeed, any efforts in that
respect would be prohibited by a 1987 ruling by the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) which was affirmed by judicial decision and order. The Union's evidence and
arguments further establish that the real grievance is an alleged failure or refusal to meet
to discuss job opportunities pursuant to the terms of the local agreement, not the Master
Contract.
FACTS
The material facts are not in dispute.
The Union represents clerks and checkers in the Port. These employees, who
often work with and alongside longshore workers, sort, receive, deliver and tally cargo
and baggage for loading and unloading into and off of ships in the Port and vicinity.
Their work includes "stuffing," which is the act of filling a container with cargo, and
"stripping," which is the act of removing cargo from a container.
The Company is a carrier which is a member of the Container Carriers Council
and a party to the Master Contract. It is also a party to the clerk's local agreement
through its membership in the Boston Shipping Association, Inc. (BSA). BSA is a multiemployer association that represents longshore employers in the Port. BSA is a party to
the Master Contract.
The public terminals in the Port are owned and operated by Massport, including
Army Berths 1 and 2 located at the Black Falcon Avenue terminal where the work in

issue was performed. The Union claims that these berths are known as "live piers,"
which are areas that are used for the discharge or unloading of vessels, for the receipt or
delivery of cargo into terminals, and for the stuffing and stripping of containers.
The Black Falcon Avenue terminal currently receives only cruise ships, not cargo
ships. No employer which is a party to any ILA contract currently stuffs or strips cargo
at the Black Falcon facility. Those tasks were done at that location by union labor in the
1960s and 1970s, but not since, although ILA locals have done longshore work in this
area. Clerks most recently worked at Army Base Berths 1 and 2 for a few months
unloading passenger ships after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York
City, which caused some ships to be diverted to the Port.
The Port has been revitalized as of late under Massport's direction. There have
been terminal and infrastructure changes and improvements, including the development
of office and warehouse complexes, in and near the Black Falcon facility. Massport
leases certain of its property to other businesses which in turn enter into sub-lease
arrangements.
hi 2001, the Union learned that cargo was being stuffed and stripped at the Black
Falcon facility. The Union asked BSA and Massport for meetings to discuss work
jurisdiction, but neither responded and there have not been any meetings held.
The stripping in issue was of two import line containers with consolidated cargo.1
These containers were shipped under a port-to-port bill of lading from Bremerhaven,
Germany to the Port of Boston. The Company's obligations as carrier were to transport
A consolidated container contains cargo which is destined to more than one consignee.

the container to Boston, discharge it at that point, ensure the cargo clears United States
Customs and that any other necessary conditions are met, including payment. Once those
matters are completed and finalized, the cargo is released at the facility and it is "TIR'd
out the gate." According to the undisputed testimony of William C. Eldridge, Company
Vice President, once the cargo is "TIR'd", the Company's responsibilities end.
The cargo in question was consigned to Logistics Management Network
(Logistics) with a destination of Black Falcon Avenue where International Cargo Port
(IntT Port) leases the Black Falcon facility from Massport. Int'l Port apparently
subleases space to other entities, including Logistics. Neither Int'l Port nor Logistics has
any contract with the ILA.
The containers were transported by agents of the consignee from the Conley
Terminal, where they were off-loaded, to the Black Falcon facility where they were
stripped by non-union labor. All of the work from off-loading until transfer to the
consignee at the terminal gate was done by members of ILA locals.
There is no evidence in this record that the Company directed or controlled the
transportation of the cargo after release to the consignee or that it requested or directed
the consignee to strip the cargo with non-union labor.
Such other facts as may be relevant are incorporated into the opinion which
follows.

OPINION
The effects of containerization on the industry are many, complicated, substantial
and of long-standing duration as detailed in the testimony and in the FMC's lengthy 1987

decision in which it invalidated container work rules that prohibited carriers from
releasing cargo to consignees for off-pier stuffing and stripping. Reconciliation of the
competing interests held by the multiple entities which are affected by containerization
under collective bargaining agreements and federal labor and shipping laws has proven to
be a difficult and elusive goal. The Union has legitimate concerns about a loss of
existing jobs due to containerization and the reduction in pay and benefits that
accompanies job losses or a stagnation in job growth. Work preservation and job growth
are unquestionably important to the Union as attested to with some passion by certain of
the Union's witnesses during the hearing. Judged from the Union's point of view, one
can understand why employees believe that it "is not right" to have a consignee of cargo,
which is not covered by any collective bargaining agreement, use non-union labor to strip
cargo at a waterfront facility where ILA labor historically has worked on that same task.
As one Union witness put it, "the work is being done in our backyard." It, thus, may be
fairly said that the equities lie with the Union which is concerned about still more of what
it regards to be its work being done by non-union labor both on and away from the
waterfront.
Notwithstanding these observations, the Arbitrator is constrained by the law, the
applicable collective bargaining agreement(s) and the issue submitted for arbitration.
Upon those considerations, this grievance must be denied because there is no violation of
the Master Contract as alleged.
The undisputed evidence upon this record is that the containers in issue were
shipped under a port-to-port bill of lading. Once the Company delivered the containers to

the consignee or its agent, and they were "TIR'd" at the gate, the Company's rights,
obligations and liabilities with respect to those containers ended, according to the
testimony and law. The Company did not have the right to control the consignee's
actions once the consignee took possession by its designated agent. There is no evidence
on the record to suggest that the Company and the consignee are in any way related
entities or that the consignee was the Company agent. Nor did in fact the Company
exercise or attempt to exercise any control over that property.
The Union essentially concedes that its contract rights would not have been
violated if the consignee had taken the containers off the waterfront and stripped them
with non-union labor. Thus, according to the Union, it is the location at which the work
was done that converted what would not have been a contract violation into a contract
violation. However, the Company had no more legal right to control the work done by
and on behalf of the consignee at an on-site location then it did to control the work at a
facility off the waterfront. The Union points to no controlling or persuasive authority that
would allow or require the Company to refuse delivery to a consignee in the latter
circumstance even if it knows or has reason to believe that the consignee is taking the
containers to an area where union members have historically worked to have stripping
done by non-union labor. Rather, it appears quite clearly that a refusal of delivery for the
purpose of forcing a consignee which is not party to a labor contract to use union labor
would be prohibited by the decision and order of the FMC as affirmed. Therefore, the
location at which the work was performed is not and cannot be the dispositive factor in
the Union's favor. Thus, whether or not the facility is a "live pier" is not the controlling
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inquiry. It is the Company's legal inability to control the consignee which is the
determining factor.
Work done by non-union labor away from the waterfront by a consignee which is
not a party to an ILA agreement is not a contract violation. Work performed at the
consignee's direction by non-union labor at a waterfront facility which the Company does
not own, lease or otherwise control is no more a violation of current contract even though
that is particularly upsetting to the Union because the work is being done in its members'
"backyard."
The Union is also inaccurate in its contention that the Company 'Voluntarily"
surrendered its control over the containers or "sent" the containers to Black Falcon for
stripping. The Company as carrier was under a contractual obligation to deliver the
containers to the consignee Logistics or its agent at the Conley Terminal under the portto-port bill of lading, which constitutes the contract between the shipper and the carrier.
The Company had neither the contractual nor the statutory right to refuse delivery
pursuant to the terms of the bill of lading. Although the Master Agreement at one time
may have prohibited delivery to a consignee if the containers were to be stripped by nonunion labor, that prohibition no longer exists in the contract since the restrictions were
held by the FMC to violate federal shipping laws in 1987.
The Company concedes that there would have been a contract violation if the
stripping had been done for a signatory to an ILA contract. The Company also admits
that if it had done the stripping by itself or through its agents that would have been a
contract violation. But those things did not happen. The consignee, with whom the

11

Company has no relationship of record except to deliver the cargo at the terminal gate,
did the act which is the subject of this grievance. The Company cannot be made liable
for the actions of an independent, non-signatory consignee.
The Union argues that the Company effectively conspired or schemed with
Logistics, Massport and/or BSA to evade its contractual obligations to the Union and to
erode its membership's historic jurisdiction over work done within the Port. That
argument, however, lacks factual support in this record.
There is a second reason for dismissal of this grievance. As the testimony
developed at the hearing, it became clear that the Union's real complaint arises
predominantly under its local agreement with BSA, specifically the alleged failure and/or
refusal by BSA, Massport or the Company to meet and bargain with the Union about
jurisdictional issues and new businesses and job opportunities at the Black Falcon
facility. Alleged violations of the local agreement are themselves subject to grievance
and arbitration under Article 39 of that agreement. A violation of local agreement has not
been submitted to arbitration in this proceeding. As such, I am not empowered to
consider any claim that the local agreement has been violated.
Article 11-12(F) of the Master Contract creates a joint committee which is to meet
with representatives of Port Authorities on issues of jurisdiction. Even assuming that this
clause can be read to require the Company to meet with the Union, the Company's
/j

alleged refusal to meet is not the subject of this arbitration. This arbitration presents

2 1 need

not and do not decide whether the Company was the recipient of a Union demand to bargain or whether it
refused such demand if one was made.
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only the question of whether the stripping done by non-union labor violated the Master
Contract. That claim does not fairly raise a refusal to bargain allegation. The grievance
submitted for arbitration concerns an alleged violation of existing work preservation
guarantees by specific acts on certain dates, not a refusal to meet to discuss that or other
jurisdictional concerns.
This same reasoning applies to the Union's claim that the Company did not
promote ILA work opportunities in violation of Article 11-12(H) of the Master Contract.
That alleged failure is not the subject of this grievance.
Both the 11-12(F) and (H) claims may be causes of action in other matters or
forums or the subject of collective bargaining, but neither is within this Arbitrator's
authority in this proceeding.

AWARD
The Company did not violate the Master Contract when the two import line
containers were stripped by non-ILA labor at a live pier after delivery of the containers to
the consignee. The grievance must be, and it hereby is, denied.

Dated:

&J

/^^/

^ ric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )
I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
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V"

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
ILA LOCAL 2046

-and-

NATIONAL CONTAINER REPAIR, INC.
\r

The parties could not agree on a stipulated issue.
In accordance with my authority and based on the record
before me, I deem the issue to be:
Whether the Employer breached the collective
bargaining agreement by employing a new hire
from the hiring hall
for the work of
operating a "wash truck" instead of awarding
that work to the grievant, TROY KERSEY, based
on his seniority?
If so, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held in Savannah, Georgia on April 12 and
June 13, 2002, at which time Mr. Kersey, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant"
and

Employer

opportunity

and representatives of the above-named Union

appeared.

All

concerned

to offer evidence and argument

cross-examine

were

afforded

full

and to examine and

witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A

stenographic record of the hearings was taken, and the parties
filed post-hearing
brief.

briefs.

The Employer

also

filed

a reply

The operation of the "wash truck" is a duty within the
Mechanic Classification.

Undisputedly, that duty is less skilled

than other Mechanic duties.
Prior to seeking the "wash truck" work, the grievant,
classified as a Mechanic, had been trained for and assigned to
those other more skilled duties, including road ability repairs,
repairs on Zim Hanjin equipment and chassis.
In mid-June, 2001, the Employer purchased an additional
wash truck and added it to the wash truck fleet.

It brought in a

new hire from the hiring hall and assigned him to the new wash
truck.
The Union contends that based on his seniority and
notice of his interest in the work, the grievant should have been
assigned to the new wash truck in accordance with Article III,
Sections 1 and 2 of the contract.

The relevant Sections of

Article III read:
ARTICLE III
Seniority
Section 1. Seniority shall prevail to the fullest
extent possible. Seniority is herein defined as:
tenure of employment as a mechanic in the longshore
industry,
exclusively.
It
will
govern
the
implementation of layoffs and assignments to newly
created
jobs
both
within
and
without
the
classifications set forth at ARTICLE I above or
otherwise falling within the coverage of this
Agreement.

Section 2.
Whenever job vacancies occur in
categories covered by this Agreement, the covered
employees will be given first consideration for
same in accordance with the order of their
seniority under the seniority list (established by
each Employer) with the concurrence of the Local
Union.
The Employer contends that as a skilled mechanic, the
grievant may be assigned to the greater skilled duties of that
classification in accordance with its managerial right (Article
XVI) to "manage its operations in the manner deemed desirable by
it"; in accordance with Article II Section 5 of the contract
which requires "employees to perform tasks or jobs within their
job classification...."; and Article III Section 3 that "work
assignments shall be at the discretion of the Employer."
The relevant parts of Article XVI - Management Rights,
Article II Section 5 and Article III Section 3 state:
ARTICLE XVI
Management Rights
The Employer retains its right to manage
its operations in the manner deemed desirable
by it, except as waived or modified by the
provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE II
Hiring Procedure
5.
Employees shall be required to perform
tasks or jobs within their job classifications and ancillary functions related to the
Employer's operations in and about the port,
provided that same are not unreasonable,
illegal or against public policy. All work
orders shall be transmitted by each Employer
to the employees through a header or

(working) foreman covered hereunder in
accordance with the established port
practices and unit work shall not be
performed by non-union persons.
ARTICLE III
Section 3. The work assignments shall be at
the discretion of the Employer.
At first impression it would appear that the Union's
grievance is sustainable under Article III Sections 1 and 2 of
the contract.
was

It can be argued that the additional wash truck

an "assignment

to

(a) newly created job both within and

without the classification (of Mechanic)," under Section 1.
as

part

of

a

Mechanic's

duty,

it

fell

"within

And
that

classification," and should be filled, on the basis of seniority
of incumbent employees.

It can be further argued that the work

is an "assignment" within the meaning of Article III Section 2,
which

accords

"covered

employees... first

consideration...in

accordance with the order of their seniority."
But, it is a well-settled principle

of contract and

constitutional law that "some things may be within the letter of
the law, but not within its intent of spirit."
I conclude that that principle applies here.
Article III Sections 1 and 2 do not stand alone.
must be read in conjunction
provisions

with the clear and

They

unconditional

of Article II Section 5 and Article III Section 3.

These latter provisions stand in stark rebuttal to the Union's
application of Article III Sections 1 and 2.

Respectively they

state unconditionally, that:
"Employees shall be required to perform tasks or
jobs within their job - classifications...."
and
"The work assignments shall be at the discretion of
the Employer."
These

provisions

support

the traditional

managerial

authority to "manage its operations."
Indeed,
regularly

made

it

is

undisputed

assignments

within

that
a

the

Employer

classification,

has
as

a

managerial function.
For that reason I conclude that Article III Sections 1
and

2

are

not

limitations

on

managerial

rights

under

the

therefore,

that

Article

III

Management Rights clause.
It

is

clear

to

me,

Sections 1 and 2 are enforceable under circumstance
the facts of this case.

not within

Specifically, I find that Article III

Sections 1 and 2 were not intended to apply to the exercise of
seniority to move from one duty or task to another within the
same classification.

What the grievance seeks here is precisely

that -- the mandatory right of the grievant to move from one set
of Mechanic's duties to another.

To permit that move, would,

obviously,

be

inconsistent

with

the

traditional managerial

authority to assign the work of a job classification to any
employee

in

that

classification,

and

would

be

manifestly

inconsistent with Article II Section 5, and Article III Section 3
of the contract, even if not within a restricted interpretation
of the Management Rights clause.
In my judgment, to permit an employee to choose his
work assignment within his classification would require much more
contractual support than is found in Article III Sections 1 and
2, when juxtaposed

with Article

II Section

5 and Article III

Section 3.
Indeed,

let

me

scenario, which supports

pose

a

hypothetical

this view.

Assume

but

realistic

that the grievant

received the wash truck job under Article III Sections 1 and 2.
Thereafter however, or even virtually with that assignment, the
Employer
Section

would

have

5 and Article

the

contractual

III Section

right

under

Article

II

3 to remove him from that

assignment and reassign him to his prior or other duties within
the Mechanic

classification.

In short, his

"success"

under

Article III Sections 1 and 2 in the instant circumstances

would

be an exercise in futility.
But assuming, as we should, that all provisions of a
contract have meaning and enforceability, Article III Sections 1

and 2 must have a meaning not in conflict with Article II Section
5 and Article III Section 3.
There are circumstance when it would apply including
by example, if the Wash Truck job was established as a new and
separate

classification

or

to

another

newly

created

classification which did not previously exist, or possibly where
the seniority bid is to an opening or vacancy in a classification
by an employee of another classification.

I am sure there are

other proper and compelling applications of Article III Sections
1 and 2, but for purposes of the instant

case, I need not go

further except to observe that I do not agree with the Employer
that they are limited to promotions and to foreman positions.
Suffice it to say that I am satisfied that the weight of all the
relevant contractual provisions compels a finding that Article
III Sections 1 and 2 were not intended to apply to a switch in
assignments

within the same classification.

circumstances

and other cases determinations

applications

of

"newly

created

jobs,"

I leave to other
of the meaning and

"job

vacancies"

or

"assignments" referred to in Article III Sections 1 and 2.
If

the

foregoing

contract

clauses

are

ambiguous,

arbitrator look to past practice for clarification.

Here, the

probative evidence of past practice is mixed at best, and hence

not

determinative.

The Employer

has

asserted

a practice

of

obtaining new employees from the hiring hall to fill the lower
levels of the Mechanics

classification without Union

objection.

It has shown that there is no posting procedure at the Employer's
location for this type of work assignment, but that postings to
obtain employees for this type of assignment are posted at the
hiring hall for bids based on port-wide seniority.
The
"rearrange"

Union

has

assignments

offered
within

testimony

of

agreements

a classification,

to

to permit

a

senior employee to pick a particular assignment that is vacant
and to place the "new hire" from the hiring hall in the opening
thereby

created

persuasive

by

probative

the

move

examples

of
of

the

senior

either

employee.

or

any

of

But
these

"practices" were not provided in the record.
I

do

believe

that

consistent

with

the

testimony there have been times when the work assignments

Union's
within

a classification have been "rearranged," but I believe that that
was done by mutual agreement and with supervision
and consent.

participation

That is not the same as asserting a "right" to a

rearrangement under Article III Sections 1 and 2.
insufficient

evidence

of

contract interpretation.

any

practice

that

would

So there is
change

my

With the foregoing findings, I need not consider the
grievant' s eligibility for the work, when at the time the wash
truck job was filled, he was on disability leave.
Also, with these findings, I find it unnecessary and
not of sufficient materiality to rule on the Union's claim that
the Employer failed to "transmit work orders...through a header
or (working) foreman..." as referred to in Article II Section 5.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties makes the following Award:
The grievance of TROY KERSEY is denied. The
Employer did not violate the contract in
refusing to allow him to exercise his
seniority to claim the "wash truck" work
assignment.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

December 30, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
UTILITY WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA,
LOCAL 369, (formerly LOCAL 387),
Union,

- and NSTAR SERVICES COMPANY
(formerly BOSTON EDISON COMPANY),
Employer.

Before:

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Board Chairman
Robert E, Motta, Company Board Member
William Can", Union Board Member

Appearances:

For the Union:
Anne R. Sills, Esq.
Segal, Roitman & Coleman
11 Beacon Street
Suite #500
Boston, MA 02108

For the Employer:
Glenn E. Dawson, Esq.
Christina T. Geaney, Esq.
Law Offices of Glenn E. Dawson
101 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108

INTRODUCTION
Suzanne King was suspended and then discharged by the Company in March 2000
for abuse of the Company's Industrial Accident Disability Benefits Plan (Industrial Plan)
and for providing the Company with false information about her physical condition
following an on-the-job injury King suffered in October 1999.
As the parties could not resolve the grievance, the matter was referred for opinion
and award pursuant to the contractual tri-partite arbitration procedures. Mr. Robert E.
Motta and Mr. William Can- served, respectively, as the Company and Union members of
the Board. Eric J. Schmertz was selected as the Board Chairman.
Hearings were held on the following dates in 2001: January 25; March 9; April
26; May 23 and 24; and July 10 and 23. The parties were represented by counsel at each
hearing who were afforded a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses
and to submit documentary and other evidence. A stenographic record was taken. There
was no objection to the conduct of the heatings. Counsel have filed detailed briefs which
have been very helpful to the Board's deliberations upon a lengthy and complex record
containing a great deal of expert medical opinion, much of it conflicting. The Union has
also filed a letter memorandum in reply to the Company's arguments about the relevance
of the Gravinese arbitration award which is discussed infra.1
The Board met in executive session on December 12, 2001 for discussion of the
record and the parties' arguments upon the issues presented.

It is well established that arbitration awards involving the same parties may be cited and included in the
parties' briefs.
1

ISSUE
The parties stipulated the following issue at the first day of hearing:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement
by its suspension or discharge of the Grievant, Suzanne King?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
RELEVANT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
ARTICLE V
MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
1. The Union and the Local recognize the right of the Company to
select and hire all employees; to promote employees; to determine
the necessity for filling a vacancy; to transfer employees from one
position to another; to suspend, discipline, demote or discharge
employees; to assign, supervise, or direct all working forces and to
maintain discipline and efficiency among them; to lay off
employees and to stagger employment when required because of
lack of work or curtailment of work; and generally to control and
supervise the Company's operations and to exercise the other
customary functions of Management in carrying on its business
without hindrance or interference by the Union, the Local, or by
employees. If the Local claims that the Company has exercised the
right to suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge employees in an
unjust or unreasonable manner, such claim shall be subject to the
Grievance Procedure in Article XXXII and Arbitration under Article
XXXHI. If the Local claims that the Company has exercised any of
the other foregoing rights in a capricious or arbitrary manner, such
claims shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure in Article XXXII
and under Article XXHI.
2. The Company, the Union and the Local recognize the
responsibility of the employees to comply with reasonable rules,
regulations and practices prescribed by the Company which do not
conflict with the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXVIII
MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS
6. Any employee upon whom his/her own physician has
placed restrictions shall be subject to examination until the
restriction is removed.
If any such employee is not satisfied with the conclusions
arrived at by the Medical Director, s/he may at his/her own expense
submit a report from a doctor of his/her own choosing for
consideration by the Company. Should any conflict result between
the examination reports of the doctors involved, the Local and the
Company shall by agreement select a third doctor who shall be a
Specialist certified by his/her respective Board who will consider
the case submitted to him/her and render a decision within one (1)
week from the date s/he receives the case, and his/her decision will
be binding upon the parties hereto.
Should the Company and the Local be unable to agree upon
a third doctor then the matter will be referred to the Massachusetts
Medical Society for the selection of the third doctor who shall be a
Specialist certified by his/her respective Board who will consider
the case
aac and
auu. his/her
1110; JULCJL decision
UCVIOIVJLJI will
WJULI be
uu binding
Uiiixiuug upon
U.JJVJAA the
LLLW parties
paiux/a ui/ii/ivj
hereto.
Each party shall compensate the doctor chosen by it for the
time spent
spenr ana
and expenses incurred in me
the case, ana
and me
the pi
parties shall
sharej equally in paving
paying the compensation and expenses of the third
doctor.
APPENDIX
ILLNESS AND NONINDUSTRJAL ACCIDENT
DISABILITY BENEFITS PLAN
AND THE
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DISABILITY BENEFITS PLAN
ILLNESS AND NONINDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BENEFITS
Illness and non-industrial accident benefits shall be governed by the
following rules:
(1)

ELIGIBILITY

Employees must have completed twelve (12) months regular
continuous active full time service in order to be eligible.

(2)

BENEFITS

Benefits shall be payable according to the following
schedule:
Years of Service

1-12 years

13+ vears

Waiting Period

5 days in any consecutive
7 day period
5 days
1 per year of service

5 days in any consecutive
7 day period
7 days
18

3 per year of service
up to 36

34

Waiting Period Benefits
Weeks at full pay
(Initial Disability Period)
Weeks at 3/4 pay
(Secondary Disability
Period)

(a) Years of Service is defined as the number of full years of active
service completed on the December 31 immediately preceding the
disability. Employees are, however, considered to have one (1) year of
completed service upon the completion of their initial 12 months of service.
(b) Pay is defined as base pay (regular compensation for normal
scheduled work days, including paid holidays and vacation). No change in
an employee's rate of pay shall become effective while benefits are being
received.
(c) Waiting Period Benefits are payable at full pay to cover the
period before the initial disability period (5 days) and for short term
illnesses to a maximum of 15 days. The payment of waiting period days is
at the discretion of the Disablement Benefits Committee.
(d) Waiting Period Days may be carried over into the next year if
any employee has completed at least a full calendar year of service. In no
calendar year, however, will an employee be paid for more than 15 days.
Unused waiting period days in excess of 15 will be held in a bank and may
be used to supplement pay for secondary disability benefits or to reimburse
for unpaid time while on the inactive payroll. An employee may elect not
to bank unused days and instead receive an additional personal day to be
taken in the following year in exchange for his or her full 5 or 7 day
allotment.

(5)

REVIEW OF ABSENCES

Employees abusing the Plan or having excessive absences shall be
subject to disciplinary action by the Company. If the Local claims the
Company has exercised any of the foregoing rights in an unjust or
unreasonable manner, such claims shall be subject to the Grievance
Procedure in Article XXXII and Arbitration under Article XXXHI.
(6)

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

(c) Benefits shall cease when an employee is retired or when his/her
employment is otherwise terminated.
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DISABILITY BENEFITS
Industrial accident benefits, for injured employees entitled to
compensation under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act who
elect to proceed against the Company's insurer for compensation, shall be
governed by the following rules:
(1) While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is
total, the Company will pay to the employee (subject to paragraphs (4), (5)
and (9) below) the excess of the employee's base pay (as defined in the
Retirement Plan as amended) at the time of the injury over the payments
made by the Company's insurer under the Act.
(2) While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial,
the Company will pay to the employee (subject to paragraphs (3), (4) and
(8) below) excess of (a) the employee's base pay at the time of the injury
and (b) the payments made by the Company's insurer under the Act or the
wages earned by the employee or both; provided, however, that no
payments will be made under this paragraph to an employee who refuses to
accept a position which is offered to him/her by the Company.
(5) Benefits shall cease when an employee is retired or when his/her
employment is otherwise terminated.
(9) The Administration of the Plan shall be under the direction
of the Medical Director and the Vice President in charge of Human
Resources of the Company whose decision with respect to all questions
arising thereunder, including questions respecting the duration of total and
partial incapacity for work shall be final, (emphasis added)

BOOK OF STIPULATIONS - LETTER 152
2. Third Doctor Provision
Without waiving or modifying the provisions of Section (8)~ of the
Industrial Accident Disability Benefits Plan, the company is willing to
consider utilizing the services of a third doctor as provided in Section 6 of
Article XXVTII on a case by case basis provided that the medical
disagreement is a disagreement between specialists in their field of
medicine.
ARTICLE XXXm
1. (d) Arbitration
If any grievance is not settled by agreement.. .then it shall be
submitted at the request of either party to a Board of Arbitration....
(f) [T]he decision of the majority of the Board shall be final and binding
upon the parties....
(g) No Board of Arbitration or arbitrator shall have the power to add or
subtract from or modify any of the terms of this Agreement or to pass upon
or decide any question except the grievance submitted to the Board in
accordance with the foregoing provisions....

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
COMPANY
King's ability to work on and after January 19, 2000 is not arbitrable because
the Company's Medical Director's decision that she could work is final pursuant to the
Industrial Plan. As King was on notice of her obligation to return to work, her failure to
report as ordered is a disciplinary offense for which she was properly suspended and
discharged.
2

Article XXXIV of the parties' agreement incorporates the book of stipulations.

Section 8 was renumbered to 9 when the collective bargaining agreement was modified. The book of
stipulations appears not to have been corrected to reflect that change.
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The Company's suspension and discharge of King was also proper because her
conduct after her injury, which included her misrepresenting her physical condition to the
Company and her giving false information about her physical condition, constituted a
further abuse of the Industrial Plan. King was able to work light duty by January 19,
2000 and was able to resume her duties as a meter reader by February 21, 2000. The
evidence submitted to the Board, including expert medical testimony and a videotape of
her activities on certain dates in January and Febmary 2000, establishes conclusively that
King misrepresented the extent of her injury and her capacity to work to the doctors and
the medical persons who were evaluating her fitness and ability to work. King's
testimony to the contrary was not believable and the Board should not credit her
testimony.
UNION
The grievance is arbitrable and the Board has the full right and obligation to
review King's physical condition as of all relevant dates for the purpose of assessing
whether the Company had just cause to suspend and discharge King notwithstanding any
finality of the Medical Director's determination.
The Company did not clearly and convincingly prove that King intentionally
abused the Industrial Plan or that she submitted false information to the Company or
anyone else. King suffered injuries while at work in October 1999 which prevented her
from working in the manner the Company was requiring. Indeed, King's good faith
efforts to comply with the Company's directives and sometimes conflicting or confusing
physicians' advice aggravated her injury to the point she became totally disabled from
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work by the date of her suspension and discharge. King is a good employee who was
eager to return to work but was advised not to do so by her doctor. King had a reasonable
basis to believe that the Company had accepted her doctor's evaluation of disability.
The videotape, showing a few minutes of isolated activity on three days, does not
prove that King was not disabled from work because the activities shown on the
videotape are consistent with the limits of her physical condition and within the
parameters of the activities doctors had recommended to help her recover.
Should the Board find King guilty of any disciplinary offense, discharge is too
harsh a penalty.

BACKGROUND FACTS
The Company, formerly Boston Edison Company, is a public utility which
distributes electricity to commercial industrial and residential customers in various areas
of Massachusetts.
Union Local 387 had represented the Company's office-technical and professional
employees, including meter readers. Local 387 has now been merged with Union Local
369, which represented the Company's production and maintenance employees.
King was hired by the Company in September 1992. She worked in the
collections department until she became a meter reader in September 1998, a position she
held until her discharge in March 2000. It is conceded by all that meter reading is a
physically demanding job.

On October 26, 1999, King was assigned to work in an "ENSCAN" van with
another employee. This van is used to obtain meter readings electronically. A computer
picks up a signal from the meters being read as the van is driven through the area. On
October 26, King was working in the jump seat in the back of the van when the van was
struck in the rear by another vehicle. King was thrown forward and unto the floor. Both
King and the employee who was driving the van were taken to a local hospital where they
were seen and released. King was diagnosed with a cervical strain. Robert Harrington,
King's immediate supervisor, called King that day at home and told her she could "not
disable herself and that she would have to report to the Company doctor.
The hospital physician had written King a note for her to stay at home the next
day, which note King had left in the office for Harrington. King called Harrington on
October 27 to tell him she was in pain and could not work. Harrington nonetheless
ordered her to report to the Company's medical department because she could "not
disable herself and that she had to be seen by the Company's medical department.
Harrington gave King similar orders on October 28 and 29 when King called in to report
she could not work.
On October 27, 1999, King was examined by John Palfrey, a Physician's Assistant
who worked for the Company. Palfrey noted neck spasms and diagnosed King with a
cervical strain. He sent her home from work for that day, and placed her on restricted
duty, which restrictions precluded King from driving, lifting, pushing or pulling more
than ten pounds. Palfrey scheduled King for a follow-up examination on November 1,
1999.
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Since King could not drive, she was assigned office work in the Meter Reading
Department doing data input on a computer, placing and receiving telephone calls, and
ensuring the meter readers had the keys to establishments on their routes. The bulk of
King's light office duties consisted of data entry using a computer placed on an old office
desk. The monitor rested on a 3 to 4 inch, pedestal that was placed on top of the
computer. The keyboard was on top of the desk, hi this "light duty capacity," King had
permission to get up from her work station, walk around, and change positions as she
wished. King asserted during the hearing that she could remain at the computer for only
short periods of time throughout this period of light duty office work because she was in
pain. She frequently got up and walked around in an effort to relieve the pain and she
often had to leave work before her four hours of light duty had been completed.
Although King never specifically complained to Harrington about pain, in part because
King bebieved that Harrington was antagonistic toward her, Harrington knew that she was
often up from her desk and walking around and that she was leaving work early and he
did not state an objection to her actions.
Palfrey saw King as scheduled on November 1, 1999. His diagnosis was
unchanged and King was continued on the same light duty office work for four hours a
day. Palfrey noted that King was in more discomfort that day than when he had seen her
on October 27 and that King had a decreased range of motion in her neck. Because of
this, Palfrey believed that King should be evaluated by Dr. Richard Conway, an
orthopedic surgeon who the Company used as a consultant. Dr. Conway also served in
an orthopedic consulting capacity for Liberty Mutual Medical Treatment Center, a part of
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Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which is the third party administrator for the
Company's self-insured Workers' Compensation claims and benefits.
On or about November 2, 1999, King, on her own, began seeing Dr. Joseph Abate,
who is also an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Abate diagnosed her with cervical strain, right
shoulder strain and multiple contusions and told her to stay out of work for four weeks.
Dr. Abate recommended physical therapy and he prescribed various medications for pain,
stiffness and inflammation King nonetheless reported to work on November 3 because
Harrington again told her to report because she could not "disable herself," as only the
Company could do so.
Dr. Conway examined King on November 3, 1999. He diagnosed her with acute
sprain of the cervical spine, moderately severe, and disabled her from any work. Dr.
Conway advised against physical therapy and King did not begin therapy despite Dr.
Abate's recommendation.
King called Harrington on November 4 and told him Dr. Conway had disabled her
from work. After Harrington told her that she would be "abandoning her job" if she
stayed home, King called both the Union office and Palfrey and on their advice she
stayed home.
King was out of work from November 4 until December 21, 1999, during which
time she continued to see Dr. Conway and Dr. Abate.
After seeing King on November 24, Dr. Conway recorded that King was "very
disappointed about her progress." King complained of right arm and shoulder pain which
Dr. Conway diagnosed as tendonitis in the right shoulder.
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King saw Dr. Conway next on December 8, ' 1999. Noting a physical setback due
to King doing "a little housework," Dr. Conway noted that King was tender "along the
right scapula at its vertebral border" and the "lateral aspect of the neck on the right side
particularly."
King saw Dr. Abate on December 10, 1999. Dr. Abate observed restricted motion,
shoulder and right cervical tenderness and a loss of sensation in the upper right forearm.
King reported to Dr. Abate that the several drugs she was taking were causing her severe
nausea and she reported having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Abate notes that King was upset
and concerned about her pain and he again recommended physical therapy, heat, rest,
medication, and an EMG.
On December 13, 1999, King saw Palfrey. King complained of right arm pain and
pain when that arm was extended out to the side and above her head. Palfrey observed
that King had a sensitivity to light touch at the right upper trapezuis and midline spine
and that she had diminished right hand grip strength.
King saw Dr. Conway on December 15, 1999 and she was allowed to return to
light duty work for four hours beginning Monday, December 20.
On December 17, King saw Dr. Abate who disagreed with Dr. Conway. Dr.
Abate believed that King should not work for two to four more weeks during which time
she should receive physical therapy. When King called Palfrey to report Dr. Abate's
recommendations, Palfrey told her to report for work on December 21, 1999, wfhich she
did. She was assigned the same type of office duties previously described.
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King did not work December 29, 1999. She was in pain and stayed home with
permission of her acting supervisor. She tried to see Dr. Conway that day but could not
wait to be seen because she was in pain.
On December 30, 1999, King saw Palfrey and Dr. Abate. Palfrey recorded that
King had pain in her right arm and right shoulder. King told Dr. Abate that she had pain
in the right side of her neck which radiated down both arms more severe on the right than
left. Dr. Abate also observed severe restrictions and limitations of King's spine,
tenderness, muscle spasm and a mild loss of sensation in her right forearm. Dr. Abate
referred King to Dr. Vaisman for pain management.
In early January 2000, King asked Harrington if she could go back to her field
duties as a meter reader. Harrington told her she could not because she was still under a
no-driving restriction which would have to be lifted before she could return to field work.
On January 5, 2000, King saw Dr. Conway. She told him that she was eager to
return to field work and that she thought she could drive. Dr. Conway cleared King for
driving for up to four hours per day.
On January 6, 2000, King saw Palfrey who concurred with Dr. Conway and
removed the no-driving restriction.. Palfrey allowed her to drive four hours per day, but
restricted her from lifting over ten pounds with her right arm.
On Friday, January 7, 2000, Harrington gave King a half meter route, specifically
a mixed commercial/residential ride book. King was not able to complete the route in
the four hours she was allowed to work.
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On January 10, 2000, her next day of work, King was assigned a residential walk
route which King completed satisfactorily. Harrington held a disciplinary meeting with
King and a Union representative to warn her, as a consequence of her performance on
January 7, that she could be suspended for not doing her job.
On January 11, 2000, King was assigned a residential ride book, for four hours
that day and four hours on January 12. Harrington reviewed King's productivity on
January 11 and concluded that it was not good. King told Harrington the route was very
long with a lot of driving and that she would likely be going back to the Company's
medical department the next morning. After her work on January 11, King saw Dr.
Vaisman who gave her four shots of Novocain on the upper part of her back into the
upper shoulder area.
On January 12, 2000, after she had been seen by Palfrey, who diagnosed her
condition as cervical/shoulder sprain, King called Dr. Conway and asked to be seen
earlier than her next scheduled appointment because she was in pain. Dr. Conway noted
that King's symptoms had increased since his last exam, but that she could still drive up
to four hours a day provided she was not required to get in and out of the vehicle
repeatedly. Dr. Conway called Dr. Paul Keefe, the Company's Medical Director, and
told him King would do best with light duty.
On Friday, January 14, 2000, Dr. Keefe examined King. Dr. Keefe believed that
King was exaggerating her symptoms during the examination and that she could do more
than she was willing to admit. Keefe assigned King six hours light duty starting Monday,
January 17 and eight hours light duty starting January 24, 2000. When King told Dr.
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Keefe that Dr. Conway had cleared her for only four hours, Dr. Keefe told her that he was
the "deciding factor" as to when she had to go back to work.
King had an appointment with Dr. Abate later in the day on January 14. She
reported to Dr. Abate that she was in pain and he noted neck restrictions and tenderness
and mild loss of sensation in the upper left arm. King told Dr. Abate about her
examination by Dr. Keefe and Dr. Abate prescribed light duty of no more than four
hours, rest, no lifting of over 10 pounds and no repeated entry and exit from vehicles.
King's next workday was January 17. The temperature that morning was below
10°F, a condition which allows the meter readers to remain indoors until the temperature
increases. King asked Harrington if she and another employee could go on a coffee ran
for the meter readers. Permission was granted. King drove and the employees returned
with coffee and food.
After the meter readers left the office for the field, and shortly after King began
inputting data into the computer, Harrington was told by another employee that King was
in the ladies room in excruciating pain. King told Harrington the same thing when she
came out of the ladies room, whereupon King went to a hospital emergency room. She
was not seen in the hospital because it was too crowded. When she returned to work,
pursuant to direction, Harrington told King she had to report to the Company's medical
department before she could leave work. Palfrey tried to examine King, but she
expressed extreme discomfort, flinched when her shoulder was lightly touched, requested
another person's presence, and eventually refused examination. Palfrey observed that
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King was very emotional and suggested that she see her own physician and to call him
the next morning.
Although she had no appointment, King saw Dr. Abate on January 17. She
complained of having terrible pain in her right shoulder area and her neck. Dr. Abate
reported significant muscle spasm and restrictions. King was given Valium and was told
not to drive. A physical therapist administered ice to break the spasm. Dr. Abate
concluded that King should be totally disabled from work for a week.
On January 18, Harrington called King when she did not report for work. King
told Harrington about Dr. Abate's report, and told him that she was in pain and could not
drive because she was on medication. Harrington told her to call the Company medical
department. King then called Palfrey who told her to see Dr. Conway.
Dr. Conway examined King on January 18 and he cleared her for four hours of
light duty work despite her pain. Dr. Conway notified the Company of this by
memorandum dated that same day. Dr. Conway that day also learned that King was
seeing Dr. Abate. After Dr. Conway told King she should choose a treating physician,
King selected Dr. Abate. Dr. Conway advised King to stay under Dr. Abate's care and
allow him to make decisions about her medical treatment.
On January 19, 2000, King did not report for work. Harrington called her and told
her that she had to "straighten the issue out" with the Company's medical department.
King then called Palfrey and told him about Dr. Abate's advice. Palfrey told her that Dr.
Conway had cleared her for four hours light duty and that she was expected to return to
work on that basis. King then called Dr. Abate's office and asked that Dr. Abate call the
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Company medical department and explain her situation. King testified that she assumed
that he had done so because she did not hear anything more from the Company until she
was suspended.
On January 20, 2000, Dr. Keefe authorized King to perform light office duties for
four hours per day. On January 22, 2000, the Company stopped King's disability
benefits because she had not reported for light duty. About that same time, the
Company's insurance carrier retained a private company to investigate King's disability
claims. A private investigator was retained to place King under surveillance on January
22, 24, 28, 29 and February 12, 18 and 21 and he videotaped certain of her activities on
January 22 and 28 and February 21, 2000, which tapes were placed into the record.
Those tapes show King engaged in a variety of activities involving neck and right arm
and shoulder movements.
King saw Dr. Abate again on January 24, 2000. He continued to disable her from
work for another 2-4 weeks, continued her on Valium, recommended another visit with
Dr. Vaisman for pain management, and prescribed physical therapy three times per week
for four weeks.
After seeing the physical therapist at Dr. Abate's practice, King changed to
another therapist, Kevin Cummings, who saw her first on January 28, 2000 for
approximately 45 minutes. Cummings noted right side pain and weakness, deficient grip
strength, which he attributed to a right shoulder injury, moderate muscle spasm and
tenderness in neck and shoulders, and restricted range of motion. There was physical
therapy also on several dates in February and March.
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Physical therapy was administered at Curnmings' office on January 31, 2000 and
February 2, 2000. February 2 was the same day King was sent by the Company's
insurance carrier to see Dr. William Kermond, an orthopedic surgeon, for an independent
medical examination (IME). Dr. Kermond examined King on February 2, 2000. He
noted muscle spasm, restrictions on neck motion and right shoulder motion. He
diagnosed her with a cervical strain, with secondary problems related to disc hemiations,
and concluded that she was not capable of returning to work, although she was wellmotivated to do so. Dr. Kermond testified at the hearing, however, that his opinion
changed after he was shown the videotape. It was Dr. Kermond's opinion that King had
faked her examination and that she was capable of working as of the dates Dr. Keefe had
ordered.
King saw Dr. Abate again on February 7, 2000. Dr. Abate noted muscle spasm
and prescribed rest and ice and that she remain out of work.
At a physical therapy session on February 16, King reported that she was feeling
stronger but was still having muscle spasms. At the February 18 session, King
complained of being sore with increased muscle spasms and tenderness. After modifying
the exercises, King reported on February 21 that she was feeling better. By February 23,
Cummings had concluded that King was not improving. Although the pain King was
reporting was less frequent, it was still present, and her range of motion was still
restricted. Cuinmings made this report to Dr. Abate and asked whether therapy should be
continued.
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King saw Dr. Abate again on February 23 and reported that she was "beginning to
have more good days than bad but having constant pain." Dr. Abate noted tenderness
and restrictions of spine and shoulders and he recommended she continue with physical
therapy two times a week for a month with Motrin and without working even light duty
because he noted her symptoms improved after rest.
King continued on physical therapy and her condition apparently improved. King
reported feeling better by February 28 and by March 6 Cummings noted that she
appeared to have had made excellent progress.
The decision to suspend and discharge King was made in late February by David
Dorant, the Company's Director of Labor Relations, Tim Manning, then Director of
Employee Relations and Health Services, Mike Flemming, Manager of Medical Services,
and Robert Motta, a Labor Relations Consultant. Dorant testified that the group decided,
after viewing the videotapes, that King should be temiinated because she failed to return
to work after being cleared and for fraud of the contract's disability provisions. King was
suspended March 3, 2000. She was notified of that action by telephone call from
Harrington on March 3 and by letter dated March 6, 2000. After a hearing on the
suspension, the Company found the suspension was justified. By letters dated March 13,
King and the Union were notified that the suspension would be continued until March 17,
2000 at which time it would be converted to a discharge.
King continued to see doctors after she was discharged. On March 13, Dr. Abate
noted tenderness and moderate restriction of spine and shoulders. By April 10, Dr. Abate
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noted definite improvement, but recorded King's complaints about her upper right arm
and difficulty with prolonged standing, walking, bending or lifting.
At a May 4, 2000 visit with Dr. Abate, King complained of severe pain in the right
neck and right upper arm. Dr. Abate noted "significant tenderness and restriction of the
right shoulder and subdeltoid area and in the proximal humerus. All motion is painful."
King last saw Dr. Abate in June 2000 when she was still complaining of neck and
arm pain. King was subsequently referred to Dr. Elizabeth Matthew, a neurologist at the
Lahey Clinic.
Dr. Matthew examined King on June 21, 2000 and believed King had rotator cuff
syndrome. Dr. Matthew recommended physical therapy for 4-6 weeks. King had
physical therapy in My and August of 2000 which treatment included Cortisone patches
and electrophoresis to King's right shoulder area.
Dr. Kermond examined King on August 21, 2000 who observed that her cervical
strain had subsided but that King had some right arm pain and restricted right shoulder
motion.
At Dr. Matthew's recommendation, King began seeing Dr. Smiley, an orthopedic
surgeon. In February 2001, King had surgery done by Dr. Smiley to correct right
shoulder impingement syndrome after injections of Cortisone in October and December
of 2000 did not eliminate her right shoulder pain.
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OPINION
Having carefully considered the record and the parties' arguments, a majority of
the Board concludes that the grievance must be denied. This result is mandated by the
provisions of the Industrial Plan that make Company-made medical determinations final.
In reaching this ultimate conclusion, several preliminary issues must be addressed.
There is first a question of arbitrability raised by the Company. The Board
majority does not agree with the Company mat this grievance is not arbitrable. The
agreement does not make a suspension or discharge of a full-time, nonprobationary
employee nonarbitrable. To the contrary, the agreement expressly permits arbitration of
all discipline which is alleged to be unjust or unreasonable. The Industrial Plan may
make the question of an employee's capacity to work as found by one or more of the
Company's agents final, but the finality of the fact question does not preclude resort to
the grievance/arbitration procedure itself. The distinction between the finality of an issue
in a disciplinary arbitration proceeding and the arbitrability of the grievance, of which the
medical issue is a part, may seem a subtle one, but it is a distinction which plainly exists
and must be recognized.
The 1975 Fallen arbitration award4, cited by the Company in support of its
arbitrability argument, is not to the contrary. The Fallon arbitration was one in which
that Board was being asked to review the Company's deteimination that an employee
was not able to work. The issue presented in that case went directly to the administration
That award and the Gravinese award arose under Local 369's contract. That is not of consequence
because the language construed in those awards is the same in material respect as the language in Local
387's contract.
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of the Industrial Plan. Such a grievance may well be nonarbitrable. But the issue in this
case is just cause for discipline. Whether the Company's action was just and reasonable
is an issue which does not arise directly from the Industrial Plan and it is one which may
or may not rest upon the Medical Director's determination. For example, the Union
argues that the charges are limited to allegations that King defrauded the Company. If
fraud were the only ground for King's discipline, then King's intent to defraud would
become relevant and the Medical Director's "final" determination of King's capacity to
work would not be dispositive of King's intent.
Entertaining a disciplinary grievance while simultaneously accepting the finality
of a determination about capacity to work is consistent with all terms of the agreement
and gives effect to all without sacrifice of any. The arbitration provisions of the contract
do not supercede the Industrial Plan provisions, but neither do the latter trump the former.
They must be read together and harmonized. The Board majority concludes that his can
be achieved only by a conclusion that the grievance is arbitrable.
Next to be considered is the parties' disagreement as to whether the Industrial Plan
is applicable to King. The contract creates two disability plans which are separate and
distinct. The Industrial Plan applies to on the job injuries and job-related illnesses which
are subject to compensation under the State's Workers' Compensation laws. The nonindustrial plan applies to other types of illnesses and injuries. Since King was injured
while at work, the Industrial Plan is applicable to her.
We turn then to a consideration of the disciplinary action taken against King. By
agreement, the Company has the right to suspend and discharge employees unless that
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right is exercised in an "unjust or unreasonable manner." Reasonableness becomes, in
effect, the test of just cause for discipline under these parties' agreement. Just cause is
established if the Company's action is just and reasonable and it is absent if the action is
unjust or unreasonable.
In assessing the reasonableness of the Company's disciplinary action, the Board is
confined to the bases for the Company's decision to suspend and discharge King. King's
suspension and discharge cannot be sustained upon grounds that are materially different
from those upon which she was disciplined. It becomes necessary, therefore, to first
define the reasons for which King was suspended and discharged.
Having again carefully considered the record and the parties' arguments, the
Board majority concludes that the disciplinary charges against King encompass more
than fraud allegations, although fraud is certainly included within those charges.
Included also, however, is an allegation that King abused the Industrial Plan by not
reporting for work after Dr. Keefe had cleared her for light duty. We reach this
conclusion for several reasons.
The disciplinary charges as written are essentially two fold. The first is general,
the second is specific. The submission of false information is reasonably susceptible to
only one interpretation. King was being accused of lying about her physical condition.
That is a fraud allegation only. The same cannot be said, however, about the first
ground.
King was charged generally with abusing the Industrial Plan. The charges do not
specify how she abused the Plan. The Union argues that a dictionary definition of abuse
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compels the conclusion that this was just another way of the Company claiming that King
had defrauded it by lying about her condition for the purpose of receiving contractual and
other benefits to which she was not entitled. But this reading of the disciplinary charges
would make the first ground largely, if not entirely, redundant of the second and make the
"abuse" allegations essentially superfluous.
Second, Dorant testified at several different times during the hearing, including in
response to questions by the Board Chairman, that King's failure to report for work after
Dr. Keefe had cleared her for light duty was one basis for the Company's action, the
other being "fraud of the disability article of the contract." According to Dorant, the
video, which persuaded the Company that King had misrepresented her physical
condition, was but "one of the considerations." The other, as made clear by Dorant's
answer to a question by the Board Chairman, was "her failure to return to work based
upon the Company's belief she was capable to do so." Dorant's testimony makes it clear
that the Company was taking action against King for two reasons. One was fraud upon
the Company. The other was her failure to return to work based upon the Company's
belief she was capable of working at least light duty.5
Third, the Company officials who met and decided to suspend and discharge King
knew that she had been cleared to return to light duty work by Dr. Keefe. They also
knew that King had not returned to work as ordered. Dorant and others in attendance at
that meeting obviously relied upon that part of the Industrial Plan that they understood

Undisputed is the fact that employees who are on disability are required to work limited duty if capable
of doing so.

5
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makes Dr. Keefe's determinations "with respect to all questions arising [under the
Industrial Plan], including questions respecting the duration of total and partial incapacity
for work.. .final." Dorant testified that Dr. Keefe's opinion was final. Moreover, Dorant
had told Union representative Thomas Burke that King would be discharged if she did
not come back to work because she had been cleared for light duty. Therefore, when the
Company described King's misconduct as an abuse of the Industrial Plan, they included a
failure to report for work as finally ordered under the Plan as one of the reasons for
King's discipline.
Fourth, the labor relations professionals at that meeting were also surely aware of
other times employees had been accused of disability plan abuse. The Gravinese
grievance was a case involving an employee who was accused of abuse of the nonindustrial plan. The Board majority in the Gravinese case discussed abuse in terms
broader than fraud. Included in the Gravinese Board's notion of abuse was an employee
who failed to return to work when he was medically able to work at least light duty when
he knew the Company wanted him to return to work. Although submission of false
documents was a large part of the basis for the Gravinese award, it was far from the only
basis. The Board in the Gravinese award viewed the grievant's self-help in deciding
when he could return to work as within an abuse of the plan.
The Board's conclusion regarding the scope of the disciplinary accusations is not
undercut by the Gravinese Board's recognition that abuse of the disability plan requires a
finding of "intentionality and purposefuhiess." Such intent need not be to commit a
fraud. As stated by the Gravinese Board, "it was not up to the Grievant to decide.. .that
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he would make no attempt to return to work because he was living in pain and in a bad
mood. Similarly.. .it was not up to him to decide that he would not return to work on
light duty." As with the grievant in the Gravinese award, King intentionally did not
report for work despite Dr. Keefe's medical determination that she could work. This
failure to report is reasonably characterized as an abuse of the Plan's terms.
That the Union also understood that the accusations against King were broader
than her defrauding the Company is reasonably established by the Company's
discussions with Burke and with King herself. Dorant explained that the Company
actually waited longer to discipline King than it might have otherwise because "we were
working with the union officials on this." Burke was complaining to Dorant that King
was not being treated fairly and Dorant did not want King disciplined until he had
finished looking into Burke's complaints out of a concern that contract negotiations with
the Union, which were then underway, might be jeopardized. After Dorant was satisfied
that King was being treated fairly and that she had been cleared for light duty, Dorant
told Burke that the Company wanted her back at work and he asked Burke to get King
back, telling him by at least mid-February 2000:
The medical department is telling me she's capable of
returning to work. If she doesn't return to work, we're going
to have to terminate this person.
King had been told repeatedly by Harrington, Palfrey and Dr. Keefe that she could
not disable herself as that could only be done by the Company's medical department and
at least once she was told that she would be abandoning her job by staying away from
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work without Company permission. Moreover, King's request of Dr. Abate that he
contact the Company makes clear that she knew she had been ordered to report for work.
King testified that she came into work when ordered for fear of losing her job. From
those several statements, a majority of the Board is persuaded that the Union and King
understood that the abuse for which King was being disciplined included her failure to
report for at least light duty work after she had been approved for that work by the
Company's Medical Director.
The next question for the Board's determination is whether, as the Company
argues, Dr. Keefe's detennination that King could work light duty was final. As the
Union correctly points out, the Industrial Plan makes determinations made under "the
direction of the Medical Director and the Vice President in charge of Human Resources
of the Company..." final. As such, the Union argues that the Medical Director does not
have sole authority to make a determination about King's capacity to work. That, argues
the Union, is a shared right and responsibility, which was not satisfied by the Medical
Director's examination and detennination alone.
The Board majority concludes for several reasons that the terms of the Industrial
Plan regarding finality of Company decisions have been satisfied. First, the
detennination by the Vice President of Human Resources need not be made by her
personally. An agent can perform duties or undertake responsibilities for and on behalf
of a principal. The involvement of the several labor relations personnel in the meeting
which led to King's suspension and discharge, in which they were aware of Dr. Keefe's
determination, and agreed with it, is sufficient to establish an agency relationship. Those
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persons could act individually or collectively for and on behalf of the Vice President of
Human Resources. As their actions were not disavowed by the Vice President, the
agency relationship is satisfied. Second, the record evidences that in cases of medical
determinations, it is the Company's Medical Director alone who has made the decisions
about whether and when employees could return to work. Dr. Keefe's testimony, that he
has made the final decision as to whether and when an employee was able to work for the
several years he has served as the Company's Medical Director, is unrebutted. Third, the
Industrial Plan unquestionably leaves to the Company's agents the power to make final
decisions "with respect to all questions arising thereunder..." There is no role reserved
for agents of the Union. Thus, when multiple company agents, including the Medical
Director and labor relations/human resource personnel concur in a decision about
capacity to work, the terms of the agreement are fairly considered to have been satisfied.
That those nonmedical persons clearly accepted the opinion of Dr. Keefe and deferred to
his professional judgment is logical and in compliance with the contract.
The "finality" language of the Industrial Plan raises another issue. The agreement
refers to decisions about "incapacity for work." A question is presented, therefore, as to
whether the agreement encompasses decisions about "capacity" to work. Dr. Keefe
determined that King had the capacity to work. This case does not involve a
determination, like that in the Fallen award, that the employee could not work. However,
the finality bestowed upon medical determinations under the Industrial Plan is not limited
to "incapacity" decisions only. The language preceding the reference to "incapacity"
covers "all questions arising thereunder." That language, by itself, captures "capacity"
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determinations and makes them final. Moreover, it would be illogical to read the
reference to "incapacity" to exclude determinations about "capacity." More often than
not, the issue will be whether an employee who is out of work has the capacity to work.
Less frequently will the issue be whether an employee who wants to come back to work
is unable to do so. The Board cannot conclude reasonably that the parties intended to
have the Medical Director decide an employee's incapacity to work but not the more
frequently recurring question of an employees' capacity to work.
The Union argues lastly that the Medical Director's decision is not final because
the "Third Doctor Provisions" of Article XXVTII and the Book of Stipulations' Letter 15
apply and were not used. However, the third doctor provisions by their express terms do
not waive the terms of the Industrial Plan. The Company has agreed to only consider
using a third doctor on a case by case basis, hi other words, use of a third doctor was
discretionary with the Company.
In summary, the Board's determinations to this point are:
1. the grievance is arbitrable;
2. the Industrial Plan provisions apply;
3. the grounds for suspension and discharge include both fraud and a failure to
report for work as ordered;
4. the Medical Director's determination that King could work light duty on and
after January 19 was final by contract and not reviewable by this Board.
In this last regard, although there could be room for argument that an arbitrary
Medical Director's determination is reviewable notwithstanding the finality bestowed
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upon such determination by contract, that need not be decided in this case. The record
here, including the medical testimony and the videotape, is sufficient to preclude a claim
that the Medical Director's determination regarding King's capacity to work was
irrational or otherwise arbitrary.
This leaves for consideration only the question of whether King's suspension and
discharge was for just cause, that is, whether it was reasonable based upon the
information the Company had at the date of the suspension and discharge. The Board
majority concludes that King was properly suspended and ultimately discharged for
failing to report for work pursuant to the Medical Director's order to report which was
communicated to King and never rescinded.
There is sharply conflicting opinion and testimony about King's physical
condition which consumed virtually all of the several days of hearing which were held in
this case. But as the Medical Director's decision as to King's capacity to work was final,
the Board is without power under the contract to determine whether, as the Union asserts,
King was suffering from a chronic, painful and disabling neck, arm and shoulder injury
until long after her suspension and discharge or whether, as the Company claims, King
falsely represented her physical condition to the Company and every physician and other
practitioner who examined her. Therefore, the Board does not consider the fraud and
dishonesty allegations which are a part of the Company's accusations against King. To
reach those allegations would require a determination about King's capacity to work
which has already been finally determined by Dr. Keefe. As the parties well know, this
Board is bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. As correctly
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recognized by the Board in the Fallen award, a review of the "final" decision about
King's capacity to work would change the terms of the parties' agreement, a result which
is prohibited by Article XXXIII. That Article prevents the Board from adding to,
subtracting from or modifying any of the terms of the agreement. For the Board to
conclude that King could not work, despite Dr. Keefe's final decision that she could,
would cause the Board to substitute its view for that of the Medical Director's in
violation of the express proscriptions of Article XXXTtl.
In assessing the reasonableness of the Company's decision to terminate King upon
the ground that she had failed to return to work as ordered, the Board must also consider
whether King had fair notice of her obligation to report for work and of the consequences
for noncompliance.
hi this regard, it is clear that the Company did not give King written notice that
she had to report for work and that she would be terminated if she did not as it usually
does in cases of this type. Dorant testified that normal procedures were not used with
King because he was discussing King's situation with Union representative Thomas
Burke and was investigating Burke's claim that King was not being treated fairly.
Although written notice to King would have been the better course for the
Company to follow, its failure to adhere to its customary practice does not mean that its
decision to terminate King is per se unreasonable. The contract does not require written
notice. The reasonableness of the disciplinary action must be decided in the totality of all
relevant circumstances. The Board majority is persuaded for the reasons stated
previously that King fully understood her obligation to report for work, the procedures
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she had to follow if she was to be properly released from that obligation, and knew that
noncompliance with Company directives and procedures could lead to her discharge from
work.
The Union claims that after January 19 no one, not even Burke, told King that her
job was in jeopardy if she did not report for work. Although the Company did not
contact her after mat date, it is unlikely that Burke did not. Burke did not testify,
although he could have been called by either party. King was in frequent communication
with Burke after that date and she was keeping a log of her daily activities at Burke's
suggestion to "protect" herself. Moreover, Burke told King to get a lawyer. These
statements had to have alerted King to the fact that her job was indeed being placed at
risk by her not reporting for work on and after January 19. Ultimately, however, it is
unnecessary to decide whether anyone specifically told King after January 19 about her
obligations and the consequences of noncompliance. King had been told this several
times before January 19 and nothing had occurred to change that instruction except
King's contention that she assumed Dr. Abate had persuaded the Company that she could
not work even light duty, an issue to which the Board turns next.
The Board has considered the Union's arguments that King reasonably relied upon
the advice of Dr. Abate not to report for work because working, even light duty, was not
allowing her to heal and was actually aggravating her condition. There are several points
to be made in response to this claim.
First, King had been told several times by different Company officials on different
dates that her doctors could not disable her from work and that only the Company's
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medical department could do that and that she would be abandoning her job if she did not
report for work as required. King several times reported to the Medical Department at
the Company's directives to secure the necessary permission to remain away from work
because she knew she needed to be excused from work by the Company. This was
brought to King's attention directly on January 14 when Dr. Keefe told her to report for
light duty despite King's statement to him that Dr. Conway believed she could not work.
That is when Dr. Keefe told King that only his opinion counted. King herself testified
that she was told by the Company that she had to work unless the Medical Department,
which has the "final say," disabled her from work even though "it's going against my
doctor's wishes." Therefore, King knew that she could not rely on any other doctors'
opinions as a basis to stay away from work despite an order to report from the
Company's Medical Director.
King argues, nonetheless, that she asked Dr. Abate's office to inform the
Company that she could not work and that she assumed that the Company had accepted
Dr. Abate's opinion because she never heard from the Company after January 19 that she
had to come to work. The Board majority does not find King's "assumption" that she
had been excused to be reasonable. King had been told unequivocally that she had to
come to work. That order was clear and it was never rescinded. At the very least, King
should have checked with the Company to ascertain first whether Dr. Abate's
recommendation that she not work was communicated to the Company and, second,
whether the Company accepted Dr. Abate's recommendation. King already knew from
her conversation with Dr. Keefe on January 14 that the Company did not have to accept
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another doctor's opinion, not even that of Dr. Conway who served as a Company
consultant. By the time in early March that King received notification of her suspension
and discharge, she had been out of work for approximately one and one-half months.
King made no effort to check with anyone in the Company during this time about her
status and she made no attempt through the Company or the Union to try to adjust her
working conditions so that she might be able to work at least light duty. For example, if
there had been any discussion about the problems allegedly caused by her computer work
station, that could have been easily corrected. Her decision to abide by Dr. Abate's
recommendation and to not report for duty as ordered without contact with the Company
is precisely the type of self-help abuse of the Company's disability plan that was
discussed in the Gravinese award. It was an abuse of the Company's benefit plans for
King to simply ignore Company directives without even an inquiry as to whether the
directive still applied in the face of Dr. Abate's contrary opinion. King was not
privileged to make Dr. Abate the Company's agent nor could she or Dr. Abate negate Dr.
Keefe's decision that King was capable of working. Put another way, King could not
rely on an assumption that Dr. Abate's recommendation was reported to and accepted by
the Company to excuse her from a duty to report for work as ordered. There is not even
evidence that King contacted the Union in these regards. Even if King were
uncomfortable for one or more reasons in speaking with the Company's personnel about
her medical condition or her working conditions, she could have and should have
contacted the Union and asked its agents to assist her in some way with the order to
report for work.
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Nor can King find any reasonable defense for her failure to report to work in Dr.
Conway's statement to her that she should choose her treating physician (Dr. Abate) and
follow his advice. Dr. Conway was simply infonning King that she should not be seeing
two doctors simultaneously for the same condition. But nothing in this statement could
have led King to believe reasonably that Dr. Conway had bound the Company to accept
Dr. Abate's recommendations when Dr. Keefe's determination as to her ability to work
was to the contrary. Indeed, King had raised with Dr. Keefe on January 14 that Dr.
Conway did not want her to come back to work at that time and Dr. Keefe told her
unequivocally that it was only his detennination that counted as to whether and when an
employee is required to return to work from an industrial disability.
By King's own admission, she stayed away from work on Dr. Abate's advice
because she believed that this was the only way her condition would improve. But in
coming to this decision, she intentionally disobeyed the directives of several Company
officials, including, most importantly Dr. Keefe's, whose decision that she could work,
and, therefore, had to work, was final under the bilaterally negotiated contract terms.
Whether Dr. Keefe's determination was accurate or not is immaterial because once it was
reasonably made it was final by contract and not reviewable by this Board in the context
of this grievance.
It should be obvious, therefore, that we do not reach any determinations on the
medical accuracy of anyone's diagnosis or the credibility of any witnesses who testified,
one way or the other, about King's medical condition. And, again obviously, our
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decision does not touch upon matters of disability or compensation payments King
received from any source.
Finally, the Chairman wishes to express to Ms. Sills and Mr. Dawson his
commendations for the highest professionalism and competence in the presentation of
their respective cases and for the uncommon excellence of their briefs.
AWARD
The grievance is arbitrable.
The suspension and discharge of King was confirmation of her having abandoned
her job by failing to comply with the Medical Director's detennination that she was
capable of working and required to report for duty. The suspension and discharge did not
violate the collective bargaining agreement. The grievance challenging the Company's
suspension and discharge is denied.

Dated:
/ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
/ Impartial Board Chairman

Dated:
ROBERT E. MOTTA
Company Member, Dissenting
as to arbitrability; Concurring on
the merits
Dated:
WILLIAM CARR
Union Member, Concurring
as to arbitrability; Dissenting on
the merits
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State of New York

)
)ss:
County of New York )

I hereby affirm pursuant to CPLR 7507 that I am the individual described herein
and who executed this instrument which is my Award.

Dated:
Eric }. Schmertz
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 369 UTILITY WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, AFL-CIO
AWARD
-andNSTAR ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY
\

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named

Union

and Company, a tripartite Board of Arbitration was appointed to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:

X

Did the Company have just cause to discharge
JAMES ROGERS on or about May 18, 2001?
If
not, what shall be the remedy?
Eric J. Schmertz was named as the Chairman of the
Board of Arbitration.

Ms. Lisa Amber and Mr. Phillip Trombly

served respectively as the Company and Union designees to the
Board of Arbitration.
A

hearing

was

held

in

Dedham,

Massachusetts

on

February 14, 2002 at which time Mr. Rogers and representatives
of the Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was

A stenographic record of the proceedings was taken and

the parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Board of Arbitration met in executive session and
deliberated on May 10, 2002.
Having duly considered the proofs and allegations of the
Company and the Union, a majority of the Board of Arbitration makes
the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
JAMES ROGERS.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman

Lisa Amber, Concurring

Phillip A. Trombly,
Dissenting
DATED:

June 22, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed thi
instrument, which is my
AWARD.

NOTE FROM THE CHAIRMAN

As

the parties

Opinion

in explanation

cases,

an

Opinion

well

know,

of an Award

provides

as

a matter

of

is not required.

useful

guidelines

for

law,

an

In most
contract

interpretation and future application and/or an analysis of the
evidence and reasoning in support of the Award.
However,

there are

rare

times when,

with

the

issue

fully and finally decided by an Award, an Opinion is unnecessary,
inappropriate or even counter-productive.

I deem this case to be

one of those.
The Chairman has written an Opinion which he chooses
not to issue, unless

asked to do so by the Union or by both

parties by mutual request.
Respectfully,

Eric
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD AND OPINION
Case #133000196601

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

-and-

LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER

-X

The stipulated issue is:
1. Are the duties being performed by JOAN
YOUNG
at the Caribbean-American Family
Health
Center,
Charge
Nurse
duties
entitling her to Charge Pay under Article 4
Section 5 of the collective bargaining
agreement?
2. Are the duties being performed by COLLEEN
DOWLING on
Saturdays at the Lutheran
Medical Center Walk-in clinic at the Family
Health
Center,
Charge
Nurse
duties
entitling her to Charge Pay under Article 4
Section 5 of the collective bargaining
agreement?
A

hearing

was

held

on May

7,

2002

at which

time

representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Each side filed a post-hearing memorandum.

The actual contractual provision that is relevant to
this case is Article 4 Section 5.

It reads:

Differential
for
Work
in
a
Higher
Classification.
A Registered Nurse who is
required to work in a higher rated bargaining
unit position will be paid an additional $25
per 1% hour shift for that position from the
first day of such assignment effective March
1, 2001.
The amount shall be prorated for
shifts other than 1% hours. Designation of
who is to work in a higher rated position
shall be made by the Director of Nursing or
supervisor designee.
In the

instant

case,

it is

stipulated

that

if the

grievances are granted, back pay shall be retroactive only to the
date the grievances were filed.
Also, as the stipulated issue provides, the claim of
grievant

Dowling

for

Charge

Pay

is

limited

to

her

work

on

Saturdays when a supervisor is not present in person.
As to grievant Young, the claim for Charge Pay is for
the periods of time that a Nurse Manager is not present.
Both

grievants are Registered Nurses.

dispute that the duties of Charge Nurse represent
higher rated bargaining unit position."

There is no
"work in a

Hence, both grievants

are eligible for Charge Pay, if they perform Charge Nurse duties.
I would so find, notwithstanding the last sentence of
the foregoing contract provision,

and dispute the fact (and the

Employer's defense) that neither grievant is entitled to Charge

I
Pay because neither were "designated" to work in a higher rated
position by the Director of Nursing or supervisor designee.
I

am

satisfied

that

Article

4

Section

5 was

not

intended and cannot be interpreted to deprive an employee of the
higher pay differential if work in the higher classification is
actually

performed merely

designated

to

work

at

because
the

that employee has not been

higher

rated

duties.

Any

such

interpretation would be an unfair circumvention of the legitimate
right to pay for the level of work performed, and could render
Article 4 Section 5 a nullity.
So here I reject

the Employer's assertion

that the

grievants are not eligible for Charge Pay because they were not
officially

"designated"

as Charge Nurses

Nursing or supervisory designee.

by

the

Director

of

In other words, if the higher

rated job is in fact worked, the "designation" to it is implicit
and constructive.
So, the issue herein narrows to whether either or both
grievants

worked

as

Charge

Nurses

for

the

periods

of

time

referred to in the issues and the stipulations.
The Union asserts that grievant Dowling is a Charge
Nurse

on

Saturdays

"troubleshooter";

because

handles

she

has

patient

been

"designated"

complaints;

provides

as

a

and

schedules breaks and lunch periods for medical assistants; makes

decisions to relocate patients due to security needs; orders and
is responsible for medications; files daily reports; rearranges
schedules
security

and patients
to handle

emergencies;

and

if a provider fails to show up;

disruptive

has

patients

initiated

and

discipline

children;
of

an

LPN

calls

handles
and

an

impaired provider.
In short, the Union contends that as the only Nurse on
duty

on

Saturdays,

she must

handled by supervision.

assume

responsibilities

normally

And that though she is instructed

to

contact Supervisors Lee and/or Vasquez for decisions in unusual
situations, neither has been readily available because Vasquez
has

no

Leaving

phone
it

and

to

Lee

has

Dowling

to

failed to
make

respond

medical

and

to her beeper.
administrative

decisions on Saturdays that otherwise would or should be made by
Vasquez or Lee.
As
position

that

to grievant Young
she

performs

it is essentially

duties

at

the

the Union's

Caribbean-American

Family Health Center similar to those performed by a RN who gets
Charge Pay at the off site Sunset Terrace Clinic.
It asserts that until last July 2nd she was the only RN
there with no supervisor on site.

It asserts that she delegates

and assigns staff and is consulted by the medical staff as to
procedures which

she

schedules in

conjunction

with

the

site

director; changes and schedules medical assistant's breaks and
lunch;

handles

clerical

and

patient

problems;

is

solely

responsible for ordering supplies; is in charge of narcotics and
medications;
patients;

schedules

orients

new

or

delegates

nurses;

making

appointments

arranges transportation

for

to the

Lutheran Medical Center, and is only one of three with keys to
the Center.

Also, it is asserted that she rearranges

schedules

if a provider doesn't show up and may arrange to send patients to
the main

facility

by

taxi

in

coordination

with

the

medical

director and site director; acts as liaison with other

clinics

and clients; and maintains the security of clinic money.
The Employer's position is simply that the presence of
a single RN at an off site clinic does not make that RN a Charge
Nurse.

Rather, with the exception of the Sunset Terrace site,

(which

the Employer

unigue

job

Charge

Nurse

explains

description
is

and

essentially

is an "aberration

based on the

responsibilities...")
based

supervise a staff of other nurses.

on

a

the

job

responsibility

of
to

And that therefore the Charge

Nurse classification is not applicable nor intended to apply to
off site clinics where there is no staff of nurses.

Rather, the

Employer asserts, all of the work and duties testified to by the
grievants and advanced
fall within the normal

by the Union on the grievants'

behalf,

and reguired duties of the Registered

Nurse classification.

And if there has been any communication

problem for grievant Bowling (i.e. in contacting supervisors Lee
or Vasquez) , that

can

and

should

be

cured

if necessary

by

bargaining or administrative remedies, but does not justify the
establishment of a Charge Nurse job for grievant Bowling.
Frankly,

the

testimony

of

the

grievants,

in

the

absence of testimony by an established Charge Nurse, gives me no
opportunity

to make comparisons with what the grievants do and

what a recognized Charge Nurse does.
both

clinics,

in

the

absence

of

It appears to me that at
a

Nurse

Manager

or

other

supervision on site, both grievants may well be performing some
duties beyond the regular RN classification.
and evidence available

to me

fall

But, the testimony

short of establishing

that

those duties either quantitatively or qualitatively rise to the
level of a Charge Nurse.
The best evidence, and indeed in the absence of direct
comparison

testimony,

is this job description

of Charge Nurse

(Employer Exhibit #1) and Registered Nurse (Employer Exhibit #3).
The

former,

as

the

Employer

asserts

is

a

classification applicable to the main Lutheran Medical Center
facility, and not to off site clinics.
also as the Employer

asserts,

More significantly and

it repeatedly refers to duties

relating to overseeing staff nurses in addition to traditional
nursing duties.

It provides, for example:

"Prepares assignment sheet - checks with
Nursing Office to confirm staffing - assigns
staff to districts."
Intershift Report:
From outgoing Charge Nurse
Ensures staff is going to break on time
Receives report from primary nurses...
Takes
shift

names

of

staffing

for

evening

Reports off to oncoming Charge Nurse
(All emphasis supplied)
There

is

no

contrary

evidence

to

the

Employer's

contention that the foregoing applies to staff of nurses.
An

examination

of

the

Registered

Nurses

job

description includes Responsibilities/Work Performed that fairly
covers what the grievants do principally.
enumerated

responsibilities

inclusive and applicable.

is

Indeed, one of the

significantly

and

obviously

Namely, under Professional Qualities/

Characteristics, the RN:
"is an integral member of the health care
team within the unit/site
to coordinate
patient care."
Again,

in

the

absence

of

more

detailed

evidence

comparing what the Charge Nurse does and what the grievants do at
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their clinics, I am unable to find that the duties the grievants
are

required

to

perform,

even

as

the

sole

RN,

exceed

that

encompassing assignment.

I acknowledge that I am troubled by the fact that a
sole

RN

at

the

Sunset

off

site

facility

Health

Center

designated as the Charge Nurse and receives Charge Pay.

is
But

again, aside from the general assertion that the duties of that
Charge Nurse are the same as those performed by the grievant(s)
there

is not

sufficient

evidence or testimony

of the precise

duties of that Charge Nurse, nor of the circumstances
in that designation.

resulting

With the traditional burden of proof on the

Union, it was the Union's duty to bring forth direct evidence of
the similarities of both functions.
claims

it

particularly

as

an

"aberration"

comparisons,

That the Employer merely

leaves

unanswered,

but

essential
does

questions,

not

cure

the

deficiency in the Union's burden on that question.

Finally,

I

am

not

satisfied

with

the

present

arrangement on Saturdays at the Pediatrics Walk-in clinic, where
grievant

Bowling

has

been

unable

to

reach

supervisors

when

alleged important medical or administrative decisions have to be
made.

Because the record

is not

clear with examples of the

magnitude or urgency of those decisions, I am unable to rule that
the poor communication

system

warrants an award of Charge Pay.
8

But on the other hand, I am not prepared to accept the Employer's
view that it is either insignificant or a matter for bargaining.
Rather, I conclude and direct that the Employer take steps to
make

a system

of communication

between

Bowling

and off

site

supervision efficient, effective and timely.

A
continuation
reaching

failure

of

of

difficulties

the

supervisor

for

the

Employer

Dowling

instructions

reserve to grievant Dowling

to

do
has

and/or

so,

and/or

experienced
assistance

a
in

will

and the Union the opportunity

to

renew her grievance de novo prospectively but not retroactively.
Also,

I do not accept the Employer' s base argument

that the

Charge Nurse classification does not and will not apply to off
site clinics.

Rather, I conclude that _if a RN at an off site

facility does in fact, and if probatively established,
Charge Nurse duties, she is entitled to Charge Pay.

performs

Indeed, as I

stated, the Sunset Terrace circumstance has not been adequately
explained

to my

satisfaction.

Therefore

in the

interest of

equity and fairness, the Union's opportunity to prove that what
Dowling and Young are doing is the same as what is done by the
Charge Nurse at Sunset Terrace and the Charge Nurses at the main
facility, is also reserved, but prospectively, not retroactively.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
Subject to the stated reserved rights the
claims of COLLEEN BOWLING and JOAN YOUNG for
Charge Pay are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

June 24, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATIOON ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #13300009440

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

-andLUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER

-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the five-day
suspension of DOROTHY TUOHY? If not,
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings

were

held

on

June

7th

October

10th,

and

December 7th, 2001 and January 31st, 2002 at which time Ms. Tuohy,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Center appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The grievant, a Registered Nurse and the nurse in
charge at the time of the event (or for a substantial part of the
events) was suspended five days for "ordering" a patient (patient

A") out of the detox unit of the Center's Acute Care Addiction
Program in the middle of the night and into the street on
May 5, 2000, despite instructions from supervision that she had
no authority to do so.
The grievant denies the charge.

She and the Union on

her behalf assert that at no time did she order and implement the
involuntary removal of patient "A," but rather that patient "A"
voluntarily left the facility and/or did so under the procedures
of voluntarily leaving Against Medical Advice (AMA).
After a review of the evidence and testimony I find
most credible and determinative the testimonies of Security
Officer Corbett and Patient Care Technician Charpeosette.
He testified that the grievant called security stating
that she had a patient whom she wanted removed (or "thrown out")
because of his disruptive and abusive behavior.

And that he and

another security guard responded to that call by going to the
floor where patient "A," was located and escorted him out of the
facility and into the street.
She testified not only that she heard the grievant
identify patient "A" to the security officers but that the
grievant expressly stated that he (patient "A") was the one to be
removed.

Also significantly, as referred to later herein, she

testified that patient "A" apologized to the grievant for his
behavior and insulting remarks to her and pleaded to be permitted
to remain in the facility.
I find these two sets of testimony credible and as
such wholly inconsistent with the grievant's assertion that
patient "A" left voluntarily and/or properly under AMA
procedures.
What happened, I conclude is that patient "A" was
disruptive and abusive.

He and others demanded the right to

smoke, to watch TV and engage in other activities contrary to the
Clinic's rules.

Patient X'A" was leading the group and verbally

insulted and abused the grievant.

He created a situation

bordering on chaos on the floor and appeared to be out of
control.

Though disputed, he may have threatened the grievant

with bodily harm.

Also, at one point he threatened to leave the

facility and take other patients with him.
So confronted, I conclude that the grievant lost
patience and decided to handle the problem by removing patient
"A" from the facility and so instructed the security officers;
who followed her instructions.
However, it is clear that at some point before Patient
"A" was removed the grievant called her superior supervisor
stating that she wanted to remove patient "A" involuntarily.

And

she was told by her supervisor that she could not do so
involuntarily

(or "Administratively") without following certain

prescribed steps, including the approval of a physician.
Despite this authoritative rejection by supervision of
the grievant's plan I must conclude that the grievant remained
angry and possibly frightened by patient "A' s" outburst and
ordered patient MA" out of the facility nonetheless by the call
to security or its later implementation.
The foregoing took place, I find, before the grievant
left the floor to go to the hospital with

Nxchest

pains."

I

reject her assertion that because she left the floor before
patient "A" was actually escorted out she had nothing to do with
his removal and that it was the responsibility of Nurse George
who took over as the nurse-in-charge.
Even if not there when security escorted patient "A"
out, it was the grievant that set that action in motion and
facilitated it with her earlier order to security.
That patient "A" did not leave voluntarily, though he
may have threatened to do so earlier, is apparent.

For if he did

or wanted to do so, there would be no reason for him to apologize
to the grievant for his misbehavior and certainly no reason for
him to plead to be allowed to stay.

As stated earlier, I accept

as accurate and credible the testimony on this point by Ms.
Charpeosette.

The Union's reliance on an AMA form (Union exhibit #2)
as evidence that patient "A" left voluntarily under AMA
procedures is not persuasive.

The form was not signed by patient

"A," but rather bears the notation ^refused to sign."

His

refusal to sign is completely inconsistent with the claim that he
left voluntarily.

Indeed, had he left voluntarily or wished to

do so he would have signed the form and left under AMA
procedures.

In any event, in the absence of a completed form or

other supporting testimony, I cannot conclude that Union exhibit
#2 is probative evidence of leaving the facility voluntarily.
Juxtaposed against the aforesaid testimony, the inconclusive form
(exhibit #2) is clearly pre-empted by direct testimony to the
contrary by Corbett and Charpeosette.
Also, if the grievant no longer intended to have
patient "A" removed at the time she left the floor to go to the
hospital, that change in intention was never expressed or
communicated to security or to Nurse George.

So her earlier

order to security was implemented and she continues to bear
responsibility for it.
That the grievant was angry, exasperated or even
thought she was threatened is an understandable explanation for
what she did.

But it is not an excuse.

She is a professional

nurse, trained especially in the care and treatment of persons

like patient "A."

Considering patient "A's" addictions,

outbursts and misbehavior are, I believe, expected if not
customary.

Professionally and legally she was obliged to handle

the outbursts, the insults and the misbehavior of patient "A"
differently then "throwing him out" of the facility in the middle
of the night.

Security is available to contain the problems, but

not, as here, to involuntarily remove the patient.

Especially

when, as here, the grievant had been expressly told by
supervision that she could not do so.
Accordingly enough of the charges have been proved to
sustain the disciplinary

suspension.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the five-day
suspension of DOROTHY TUOHY.

Eric J. /^fchmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

April 5, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATIOON ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
RULING ON
ARBITRABILITY
Case #13300019661

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

-andLUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER
-X

The threshold issue is:
Whether the grievances of RN JOAN YOUNG and
RN COLLEEN DOWLING are arbitrable?
A hearing was held on January 17, 2002 at which time
Ms. Young and Ms. Dowling appeared, together with representatives
of the above-named Union and Employer.
Ms. Young claims that she is entitled to "Nurse-inCharge" pay for working at the Caribbean-American Family Health
Center.
Ms. Dowling claims that she is entitled to "Nurse-inCharge"
clinic.

pay

for working

Saturdays

at

the

Pediatric

walk-in

The Employer contends that both grievances are timebarred from arbitration under various sections of Article 19 of
the collective bargaining agreement.

The pertinent sections are:

2.

Informal Discussion. A Registered Nurse
who has a grievance will present the
claim promptly to the Registered Nurse's
supervisor. The Registered Nurse and the
supervisor will discuss and attempt to
resolve the complaint.

3.

Procedure and Time Limits: Step one. If
the grievance is not adjusted by informal
discussion as provided for in paragraph
2, the Union may serve a written notice
of grievance on the applicable Clinical
Director, or designee, within ten (10)
days after occurrence of the facts on
which the grievance is based. If no such
notice is served in the time specified,
the grievance will be barred. Within ten
(10) working days thereafter, or within
five (5) days following any conference
between the local representative and the
Clinical Director or designee, the answer
of the Clinical Director shall be given
to the local representatives.

9.

Time Limits and Miscellaneous. All time
limits herein specified shall be deemed
to be exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays. The time limits specified in
this Section shall be deemed to be
substantive provisions and failure to
comply with such time limits or any of
them shall be a complete bar to any
action by reason of such grievance.
Failure on the part of the Employer to
answer a grievance at any step shall not
be deemed acquiescence thereto and the
Union may proceed to the next step.

The Employer points out that Nurses Young and Bowling
worked in the positions and at the locations in their grievances
for 3^ years and 9 months respectively before they filed
grievances.

And that during that time there had been no

substantive or significant changes in their job duties or
responsibilities.
To wait those respective periods of time before
grieving, argues the Employer, is not to "present the claim
promptly. . ." within the requirement of Section 2 of Article 19.
(emphasis added)
Moreover, argues the Employer, the passage of that
amount of time constitutes a failure to comply with the provision
in Section 3 that the grievance be filed in writing "within ten
(10) days after the occurrence of the facts on which the
grievance is based."

(emphasis added)

Or, in other words,

years and 9 months of unchanged conditions are too far beyond ten
(10) days from the "occurrence" of the basis for the grievances.
And, finally, Section 9 expressly provides that the
foregoing time limits are mandatory statutes of limitation.
I am persuaded that the requirement of "making a
prompt" claim and reducing the grievance to written form within
ten (10) days must be read by a rule of reason and within
traditional interpretations of the principles of laches and
statutes of limitation.

In my experience, the well-settled rule

is that time limits and a requirement of "prompt" or expeditious
action begin to run from the time the facts of the dispute are
known or should have been known to the person(s) affected.
Therefore, in the instant case, the grievants were
required to make their initial claims to their supervisors
"promptly" after they knew or should have known that they were
(in their opinion) entitled to "Nurse-in-Charge" pay.
Section 3 is unclear as to whether the ten (10) days
includes the informal discussion of Section 2 or is a separate
time limit thereafter.

Logic compels an interpretation that the

ten (10) days begin to run after the informal discussions of
Section 2 have failed to resolve the dispute.

Otherwise, the ten

(10) days could be consumed within the Section 2 informal
discussions, ousting the grievance from Section 3 application.

I

am certain that that result was not intended.
Therefore, for the instant case, the grievants were
required to reduce their grievances to written form within ten
(10) days of the completion and failure of the informal
discussions.
I find the facts in this case to be as follows:
Nurse Dowling's undisputed testimony was that though
she was in the job in question since February 1, 2000, she did
not become aware of the circumstances warranting Nurse-in-Charge
pay until November 2000.

She testified that it was at that

latter day, because of staff reductions at the walk-in clinic
that her troubleshooting responsibilities justified the higher
rate of pay.
Thereafter, in December 2000 she raised the issue with
supervisor Lillian Vasquez, who promised to discuss it with Sue
Lee, the Director of Nursing.Dowling heard nothing further from
Vasquez or Lee.
I conclude that after November 2000, when Dowling
became aware of her claimed entitlement to Nurse-in-Charge pay,
her asserted claim to Vasquez in December 2000 adequately met the
"prompt presentation" requirement of Section 2.

Considering that

triggering event, I find no evidentiary basis to hold that she
should have known earlier.

Thereafter, Dowling filed a written

grievance on January 18, 2001.

Not having received any answer

from Vasquez or Lee, I conclude that the time from the point that
the Employer should have given an answer, to January 18, 2001
when the written grievance was filed, adequately met the ten (10)
day requirement of Section 3.
I find similarity with regard to the grievance of
Nurse Young.

She testified, again unrefuted, that from

discussions with another employee (a Ms. Granderson from Sunset
Terrace clinic) who was receiving Nurse-in-Charge pay, she first
learned of the facts upon which her claim is based late in the
year 2000 and raised it with Ms. Hall, the site director of the

filed within the time limits of Section 2 or Section 3.

So, not

only has the Employer not met the burden of proof of nonarbitrability, but in failing to assert that defense in its
various grievance step answers, waived any such objection, or at
least did not consider it a defense.
Accordingly, the grievances of Nurses Bowling and
Young are arbitrable and a hearing on the merits of those
grievances shall be set.

Of course, if the grievance(s) are

sustained on the merits, and if there is any retroactive monetary
payments, they shall not go further back than the date of the
grievances.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 7, 2002

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

